The spread of nuclear weapons and the threat of their use is creating well-founded anxiety in all parts of the world. In the face of current circumstances, it can be difficult to discern the hard-fought mechanisms and tools in place to address concerns about the truly global threat posed by these terrible weapons.
In 2009, the United Nations General Assembly brought attention to the investments made in global peace and security with its unanimous adoption of , by which it declared 29 August the International Day against Nuclear Tests. The resolution recognized that “every effort should be made to end nuclear tests in order to avert devastating and harmful effects on the lives and health of people and the environment,” and that “the end of nuclear tests is one of the key means of achieving the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.”
More than 60 years after the devastating use of nuclear weapons on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the General Assembly had acknowledged the need for increased public awareness and education about the dangers of nuclear testing and the need to end such tests.?
Between 1945 and 1996, more than 2,000 nuclear tests were conducted at dozens of sites around the world. During that period, the average explosive yield of nuclear tests each year was equivalent to nearly 1,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs. The tests helped create weapons that are orders of magnitude more powerful than those used during the Second World War and have long-lasting health and environmental consequences.?
In 1996, while recognizing that a nuclear arms race was one that could not be won, States adopted the (CTBT) to ban nuclear tests by anyone, anywhere, for all time. In the 25 years since the Treaty was opened for signature, 186 States have signed it and 174 have ratified it; fewer than a dozen nuclear tests have been conducted, with only one country carrying out tests this millennium. This underscores the meaningful and measurable CTBT contribution to preventing the further spread and use of nuclear weapons.
Due to the success of the Treaty, it is often taken for granted that we live in an age where nuclear testing is recognized as a clear threat to international peace and security. This is understandable because for more than two decades, every nuclear test has been met with near universal condemnation, and nuclear test sites have been shut down or converted for other national security purposes.
The adoption of a total ban on nuclear testing was never a foregone conclusion. More than 40 years passed between the first call for a stand-still agreement on nuclear testing in 1954 and the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996. Putting in place a comprehensive, universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory prohibition on nuclear testing was a momentous achievement for humanity, and a victory for science and diplomacy in support of peace and security. We can all be inspired by the history of the Treaty and the efforts it took to make it a reality, from the extensive scientific research to the long hours of negotiations.
This Treaty has already accomplished a lot. The signatures and ratifications from countries committing themselves to a global ban on nuclear tests are an essential contribution to our collective efforts to strengthen the powerful international norm against nuclear testing and to achieve a world free of such tests.
The CTBT prohibition on nuclear testing is backed by a proven global verification regime. The lynchpin of this regime—the (IMS), with over 300 monitoring facilities around the world—is nearly complete. A union of ingenuity, engineering?and international cooperation, IMS has demonstrated its ability to meet the verification requirements of the Treaty on multiple occasions, including detection of all six nuclear tests conducted this century. The global cooperation required to design, implement and operate the verification regime offers a blueprint for how to develop effective multilateral verification measures.
The verification regime also provides value beyond the core mission of nuclear test monitoring. The range of applications of data collected by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) are broad and offer myriad benefits for the global community, from the contribution of real-time data to tsunami early warning systems to earthquake detection and climate change research.
The use of CTBTO data for civil and scientific applications also furthers our nuclear test monitoring mission. When scientists and researchers use the data to study whale migration patterns or asteroids entering the Earth’s atmosphere, their enhanced understanding of these processes helps CTBTO analysts distinguish naturally occurring events from nuclear explosions.
While the Treaty has already helped advance the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda, we must remain vigilant. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the threat of their use continue to pose unacceptable risks to humanity. There are nearly 13,000 nuclear weapons in the world today, and as United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres noted in his address to the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 1–26 August 2022), humanity is “just one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear annihilation.” ?
Effective arms control and disarmament measures are the best tools we have to address this risk, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime are integral to the non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. As we continue to build on the Treaty’s success, my hope is that every 29 August we pass, we are that much closer to achieving a complete end to nuclear testing. We owe this to ourselves and especially to future generations. ?
to see Executive Secretary Floyd's video message on the occasion?of?the?International Day Against Nuclear Tests - 29 August 2022.
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