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"Globalization, Employment and Women's Empowerment"

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Globalization, Employment and

p.14). Today, employment objectives, the creation of decent jobs and broad-based, redistributive social security sy is by no means unprecedented (Hirst and Thompson 1994). In fact, the process of international economic integration from the 1880 until 1913, most observers agree, surpassed many of the contemporary indices of globalization, albeit perhaps not at the same pace.[2] For example, OECD share of export trade to GDP in 1913 may have exceeded the level reached in 1973, and by 1991 the share did not enormously exceed that for 1913 (17.9 percent in 1991 compared to 16 percent in 1913, (cited in Weiss 1997)).[3] Looking at the more contemporary era, while there is no doubt that both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade have been significantly lowered in recent years—in East Asia and Latin America, for example, they were around twice as high in 1964-73 than they were in 1990—world exports were expanding far more rapidly between 1964 and 1973 than in the subsequent, trade-liberal, era.[4]

This should not, however, be taken to suggest that there is nothing new about contemporary globalization: there are monumental changes taking place and the crucial role of technological change, particularly in communications, transport and information processing cannot be overemphasized (Jomo 2001). Today what happens in one part of the world carries far greater impact on other parts of humanity and does so much more quickly than was once the case; *the global financial market is arguably the most dramatic manifestation of this change* (Helleiner 2000).

Second, while the orthodox globalist position predicts an all-encompassing tendency in world trade, production and investment, in fact these flows have remained *highly concentrated*, largely within the rich OECD countries and only *some* developing countries, while *most* developing countries have not integrated into the so-called 'global' economy. In the case of FDI (foreign direct investment), for example, there are currently four FDI clusters (Köhler 2001): the European Union; North America (with US as lead FDI investor and host, and including Canada and Mexico); a group of countries in East and Southeast Asia comprised of China, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Malaysia; and the Mercosur members Brazil and Argentina. Together these four clusters accounted for 90 percent of all FDI inflows in 2000 (Köhler 2001).

It is in the finance sector that the reality of a *global* market seems indisputable. Since the removal of the gold standard in 1971 and the subsequent liberalization of exchange controls, international capital flows have reached spectacular levels. However, just like FDI flows, financial flows have also been highly concentrated and uneven, with over three quarters of portfolio investment going to only ten or so developing countries—the so-called 'emerging markets' (UNDESA 1999). Still, there have been important changes as far as a wider range of developing countries are concerned. Official financial flows, for example, which until the early 1980s accounted for the bulk of international capital flows to the developing world are now being overtaken by private flows (with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East where the former continue to predominate) (U

1997, p.18). Industrial policy, they argue, continues to play a large role in the Asia region even though by its very nature '*the very capacity for industrial policy is one that requires the state to constantly adapt its tools and tasks*' (Weiss 1997, p.19). The point to emphasize is that 'because state capacities differ, the ability to exploit the opportunities of international economic change—rather than simply succumb to its pressures—will be much more marked in some countries than others' (Weiss 1997, p.26). In the aftermath of the Asian crisis, for example, the state in South Korea has once again taken charge of reorganizing social and market institutions and is refocusing its goals (which may well include the liberalization of the domestic economy) (Woo-Cumings forthcoming), while the real challenge for a country like Thailand is to 'overhaul it bureaucracy', which among other things, would mean increasing pay to improve its capacity to govern the economy (Weiss 1997, p.5).

Finally, the orthodox globalist claim of 'the powerless state' has also been applied to the social policy field. The argument is that the competition triggered by capital mobility—68.4972 566.0014 Tonom and Republic of Korea’s a decade or two

according to the ILO statistics, Chile appears as an 'overproportionate welfare spender with expansionist social policies' (Alber and Standing 2000, p.108). However, based on in-depth information on institutional changes, and data on central government expenditures provided by the UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean, Stephen Kay (2000), who was a member of the ILO research team, depicts Chile quite differently. According to his analysis, which is ‘institutionalised welfare state model’, women have global, there has nevertheless been a clearly discernible trend toward global economic liberalization (compared to the previous three decades). This has involved liberalization of the international trade in goods and services on the one hand, and the flows of international capital (foreign direct investment, portfolio equity investment, borrowings, etc.) on the other. The extent to which external liberalization has weakened the national state and led to ‘social dumping’ are complex questions given the *diversity* both in state capacity as ns g

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growth.[9] And, second, that the disruptions caused by *financial liberalization* have had a devastating impact on the growth of real economies. We will look at these two factors in turn.

As is now widely appreciated the debt crises of the early 1980s, in turn induced by US-led deflationary policies, provided a critical opportunity for Washington to try to impose a series of new policy regimes on indebted developing countries through the international financial institutions (Jomo 2001). This new macro-economic policy agenda included fiscal restraint, open trade and capital accounts, and privatization, all of which reflect an acceptance of price stability as the primary concern of macroeconomic policy (described in some circles as the 'Washington Consensus'). In other words, the main targets of macro-economic policy have been low inflation and balanced budgets, regardless of the implications for social development—and indeed, as we have seen, for growth.

economy? Rather than a single unique answer to many of these questions, there is instead a range of alternative development paths, each deriving from different combinations of a large number of relevant factors (Cornia 2000). While this seems to be nothing more than a truism, the implications in term of development *polic*

practice, and the consumption of non-traded goods has also been under-estimated (Baulch 1996). It is also questionable whether ‘shadow prices’ can meaningfully translate the different kinds of values that are embodied in non-market goods and services into monetary equivalents that are comparable.

In practice while most official studies of poverty, such as the World Bank’s Poverty Assessments (PAs)[14] begin by asserting the multi-dimensionality of poverty, they end up giving priority to an income and/or consumption definition, a poverty line measure and a quantitative estimate of the percentage of people in poverty. At the same time, many of the potential insights about the nature of impoverishment, or poverty processes, which emerge from the qualitative and ‘participatory’ research are either marginalized or dropped from the analysis (Lockwood and Whitehead 1999). This is a fundamental methodological choice, since it locks these studies of poverty into reliance on expenditure data from household surveys, which tend to be unreliable and non-comparable (Lockwood and Whitehead 1999). In most African and Latin American countries, household budget surveys are one-off (non-repetitive) exercises, which make them unsuited as a device for monitoring poverty.[15] There is also little consistency in how the poverty line is established, even for the same country: in the case of the World Bank’s PAs, some of them define the poverty line in absolute terms and others in relative terms; some deflate household expenditure by average household size while others use expenditure per adult equivalent. Such methodological inconsistency effectively defeats the purpose of collecting quantitative data, since one of the rationales for using quantitative data is precisely that they are comparable over time and across context (Lockwood and Whitehead 1999).

The reliance on poverty lines and household expenditure data has profound implications for how gender issues are analysed. Measuring poverty on the basis of household expenditure data effectively ignores the long-standing feminist concerns about intra-household distribution. It is very rare to find standard surveys, such as those carried out in the context of the PAs, embarking on a quantitative exploration of intra-household poverty. Per capita and adult equivalent measures make assumptions about *equal* intra-household distribution of resources. Gillian Hart’s (1995b) interrogation of the claims made by those using collective models of the household to be able to recover intra-household distributional patterns from household surveys using sophisticated econometric techniques .lso r0 0 12 502169.12841262w 128sntcnIso r0 0 12 502167.8

As Elson (2001) rightly argues, there are many problems in assessing the impact of particular policy programmes on how women and men have fared (in terms of nutrition, life expectancy, and so on). One major source of problem continues to be the lack of timely, reliable, se

69-71). Again, the picture is mixed. But even enrolment ratios, which are widely believed to provide an over-optimistic assessment, show that there have been regressions in some regional contexts—and this despite the policy emphasis that has been placed on female education as the panacea for all development ills. One of the benefits of education for women should be to enhance their economic entitlements. Yet, despite the link between education and income, studies from diverse regional contexts indicate that equal years of education do not translate into equality of job opportunity for men and women (UNIFEM 2000, p. 71). Men everywhere tend to get better jobs than women with similar levels of education. A complex set of forces explain the persistence of gendh2/g

South. In turn, high rates of unemployment in the North are, according to this view, to be blamed on the same North-South migration of jobs. Is this argument supported by existing empirical evidence? Has trade liberalization expanded employment opportunities in developing countries? These questions are explored in section 3.1 below. Women, in particular, are often seen as the winners of labour market changes unleashed by trade liberalization. Section 3.2 will therefore be looking at the evidence behind this assertion. Are women the *net* beneficiaries in terms of employment generation and destruction consequent upon trade liberalization? Which groups of women have gained and which groups have lost? What has women's increased presence in labour markets meant in terms of economic and social entitlements as well as in more qualitative terms as far as changes in gender relations are concerned?

3.1 Manufacturing employment: North and South

There is a widespread perception among policy-makers and some sections of the public in the North that processes of trade liberalization over the past two decades have contributed to a significant shift in the structure of global manufacturing production, from the North to the South. A significant part of the academic literature on trade-related employment (by economists) has been concerned with the impact of North-South trade on unemployment and wage inequality in the North. The effects of such global integration on workers in the South 'have generally been taken to be unambiguously positive' (Ghosh 2000, p.4), and have received surprisingly little empirical scrutiny. Only recently has more sustained attention been directed at the impact of global integration on workers in the South (Ghose 2000; Ghosh 2000) (Singh and Zammit 2000a) (UNCTAD 1999) (UNCTAD 2001). This section of the paper draws heavily on the findings of this emerging literature.

One of the main arguments emerging from the trade literature is that the expansion of North-South trade has brought about substantial employment gains in the South, while it has given rise to high rates of unemployment among the unskilled workers in the North. More recent studies4(e134s73d2 0 0 12 312.690 0c44 372.8022)Tj-0.0006 Tc 0.0006 Tw 12 0 0

The evidence on trends in wages and employment of workers in the North over the past two decades clearly show a marked deterioration in labour market conditions: increasing unemployment in Europe; falling real wages and increasing casualisation of labour in the US; and the significant weakening of trade unions in both contexts. An important factor behind the rising rates of unemployment and increasing wage inequality in most industrialized countries over the past two decades has been job loss in the manufacturing sector, which has in turn been due to a displacement of unskilled labour on a significant scale in a number of industries in which developing countries have increased their market share (UNCTAD 2001). Hence the public concerns about jobs and wages in the North are clearly well-founded. Yet, the results of recent research indicate that there is very little basis for the popular perception that deteriorating conditions in the North are to be blamed on trade with the So

(Ghose 2000).[20] It is the export performance of this small group of countries that explains almost all the significant increase in developing country manufacturing exports over the past two decades and therefore accounts for what is often regarded as a major shift in trade relations between the North and the South. Thus the share of these countries in total merchandise export from the South increased from 33 percent in 1980 to 72 percent in 1996, while their share of manufactured exports of the South went up from the already high figure of 73 percent to 88 percent over the same period. Inevitably, the nature of economic relations between the North and the rest of the South (i.e. excluding the ‘Group of 13’) remains largely unaltered, and they have been for the most part unable to shift their export base from primary commodities to manufactures. It is fair to conclude therefore that the international division of labour between the developing countries *excluding the ‘Group of 13’* and the North ‘underwent no major qualitative change’ (Ghose 2000, p.14). Consequently, it would be meaningless to argue that the developing countries as a group have gained (in terms of structural change, export earnings, employment, and so on) from North-South trade in manufactures given that no such shift in trade has actually taken place.

The next important question to consider is the extent to which shifts in North-South trade, and the export-orientation of manufactures among this small group of countries has led to significant employment gains. As one author puts it, ‘Obviously, if manufacturing jobs have been going anywhere, then it must have been to these locations, since they account for the lion’s share of manufacturing exports of all developing countries’ (Ghosh 2000, p.5).

Using the UNIDO database for the period 1980-96, Ghose (2000) compares the labour-intensity of export-oriented industries in some of these dynamic developing countries to their import-competing industries, as well as the employment elasticity of manufacturing over the period when growth of manufactured exports accelerated. He reaches the conclusion that in a number of countries (China, Indonesia and Malaysia) trade liberalization did increase the employment elasticity of manufacturing. He also explicitly rejects the argument that trade liberalization in developing countries has reduced employment in the import-competing industries. Some possible explanations are offered for this counter-intuitive finding: first, trade might have eased the foreign ex employment expansion as a whole rather than relying on the factor-content approach which is used by Ghose (2000). First, it is clear from the datasets used by Ghosh (2000), reproduced below in Tables 2 and 3, that with a few notable exceptions—China, Malaysia and Chile—many of the even supposedly dynamic developing countries experienced only a low to moderate employment growth in manufacturing, and that for several countries (e.g.

South Korea	1980-90	4.4
India	1980-90	1.4
Sri Lanka	1980-97	2.8
Brazil	1985-98	-6.8
Colombia	1980-97	0.4
Mexico	1985-98	2.9
Kenya	1980-97	2.5
South Africa	1980-93	-.1
Zimbabwe	1980-97	1.3

Source: Ghosh (2000), Calculated from ILO Yearbooks of Labour Statistics

The other important point to note about the data cited above is that it refers to *total* manufacturing employment, and not just the export-oriented manufacturing job creation. It therefore includes any job loss as a result of import penetration. The data is thus indicating the overall growth rate or *net job creation or destruction* in these countries. Thus what the data on employment growth for even the more dynamic economies seems to indicate is that the perception that the recent period has seen a significant expansion of manufacturing employme

The second factor that can help explain the disappearance of manufacturing jobs in the South, highlighted by (UNCTAD 1999), Ghosh (2000) and others is the so-called 'fallacy of composition' in export expansion. As more and more Southern countries have attempted to replicate the export success of the East Asian 'tigers' (and have been encouraged to do so by the IFIs), more and more manufactured goods exports from the South are beginning to display the characteristics of primary commodities—price volatility and low price and income elasticities of demand. This is why genuinely dynamic and successful countries that have been able to expand net manufacturing employment are so few and far between, despite the large number of countries that are attempting to use export-orientation as the basis for economic expansion and employment generation (Ghosh 2000).

Some of these factors are further elaborated below in section 3.3 where we look more specifically at the dynamics of female employment in the context of trade liberalization.

3.2 Female Employment in the 1980s and 1990s

Women are certainly more likely to be working outside the home than ever before. Between the 1950s and the end of the 1990s, the proportion of women aged 20–59 who were in the labour force increased from around one-third to one-half. The current participation rates by region range from 14 per cent in North Africa to 76 per cent in East and Central Europe (see figure 1). In many cases, women's participation has increased at the expense of men's. In half the developing countries for which data were available, over the period 1975–95 the female participation rate rose while the male rate fell. The global labour force has become more female—rising from 36 per cent in 1960 to 40 per cent by 1997.

But it is also important to underline an important counter-trend taking place in the 'transition' economies of East and Central Europe, where women's formal employment has fallen since the on-set of economic reforms. The female labour force participation rate was lower in 1997 than in 1985 in all transition countries, and the drop in female employment was as drastic as 40% in Hungary (UNIFEM 2000, p.73), although this may hide the increasing informalisation of female labour not only in Hungary (Szalai nd) but also elsewhere in the region.

Figure 1—Women's labour force participation, 1980s and 1990s



Note: Uses the latest census available in 1999.
Source: (UNRISD 2000, p.133)

To some e7BT048604 Tm(us avai5.049.9604 Tm(e)Tj12 512 324us avai5.049.9nt th04 Tm(e)Tj12 0 87 little change in the division of domestic labour? Some of these questions are explored in greater depth below.

3.3 Female employment in the manufacturing sector

It is widely argued that industrialization in the context of globalization is as much female-led as it is export-led (Joekes and Weston 1994) (Standing 1989). By the mid 1990s a clear consensus had emerged which considered the growth in international trade to be, on the whole, favourable to women's participation in the paid labour force (Joekes 1995). The increased absorption of women workers into the manufacturing sector in developing countries, it was argued, has clearly been driven by changes in trade performance in two senses. 'On the one hand, women have been the actively preferred labour force in exporting industries, and on the other, the change in trade orientation has entailed the relative decline of privileged male employment in autarkic industry' (Joekes 1995, p.ii).

While some important elements of this assessment still hold true, a number of trends since the mid-1990s in the employment patterns of developing countries, raise noteworthy questions. First, what was perhaps not sufficiently highlighted by some of the early assessments of the benefits of trade for women is the simultaneous destruction of jobs as cheap imports replace domestically manufactured goods—a point that was raised above. So the net impact of trade liberalization may not be as positive as the gross employment figures for the export-oriented sector suggest. The second important factor is the slow-down in the capacity of the export-oriented sector to create employment in more recent years—even in the more dynamic Asia

Perhaps the single most striking piece of evidence for the feminiz with the case of China, while it is clear that export-processing industries depend more heavily than the older state-owned industrial sector on female workers (many of them young rural migrants), this does *not* mean that the latter were/are insignificant employers of women. While the new export processing enterprises employ a highly feminized work force—female workforces of the order of 80% according to many studies—at the same time the Chinese State Statistical Bureau figures for 1994 show that 39.3% of the workforce of state-owned enterprises and 50% of the urban collectives' workforces were women (cited in Davin 2001). The numbers of women having lost their jobs already, and those now facing the risk of job loss in the near future as China further liberalizes its economy are thus significant.

Table 4: Employment by Ownership of Enterprise in China (all urban except TVEs) in 1994 and 1998

	1994	1998
1. Urban state-owned units	112,140,000	90,580,000
2. Enterprises funded by Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan capital	2,110,000	2,940,000
3.Foreign funded enterprises	1,95,0000	2,930,000
4. Privately owned, shareholding, jointly owned and corporations	6,760,000	20o

urban and rural areas of the country, employing large numbers of men and women and very often catering to demand from the poorer strata of the population; interestingly, it is the decline in agricultural wages and incomes due to import liberalization—substantial imports of cheap foodgrains which have depressed domestic foodgrain prices—that is behind the fall in ***demand*** for the products produced by these rural industries (Rashid 2000). While we do not have gender-disaggregated data to ascertain the gender composition of job losses in these informal sector industries (or in the import-competing industries noted above), a significant proportion has been for the category of 'unpaid family workers' which must include significant numbers of women.[22]

The second qualification that needs to be made is that employment expansion in several regions have already slowed down and are likely to decline even further as the global economy further decelerates. Section 3.1 (Tables 2 & 3) has already elaborated this issue, and so it will not be pursued any further here. Suffice it to say that with a few notable exceptions—China, Malaysia and Chile—many of the even supposedly dynamic developing countries experienced only a low to moderate employment growth in manufacturing, and that for many other countries such employment actually declined in absolute numbers from 1985 to 1998. Another important trend is that those countries that have accelerated their manufactured exports (the 'successful' countries in Tables 2 & 3), like Malaysia and Indonesia, have been facing diminishing terms of trade between 1985 and 1995, despite signiw1 469.4012 Tm(e 0 0 12 335.18310Cr24.6009 Tm(

and low value-added in exports can keep export prices low and weaken the terms of trade, resulting in a form of immiserising growth along the lines noted above. ‘Thus to the extent that gender inequalities and gender biases are allowed to keep wages perennially low’, Gita Sen asserts, ‘these can reinforce structural inequalities in global trade between South and North’ (Sen 1999b, p.9). The policy implication of Sen’s argument is that the challenge for industrial policy is to forge a transition from the so-called ‘low road’ (based on cheap labour) to the ‘high road’ (based on increasing worker productivity), (and one would add) combined with better policy coordination at the global level to avoid the ‘fallacy of composition’ likely to result when a large number of countries pursue a similar strategy.

This, however, takes us to the ***third qualification*** we wish to raise in this section. What happens to the gender composition of the labour force when such a transition takes place? The employment trends in East Asia, especially among the first-tier NIEs that have successfully restructured and up-graded their labour-intensive exports by shifting towards skill-intensive products, are highly informative in this respect.[24]

In the latest issue of the United Nations Report, **The 1999 World Survey on the Role of Women in Development** (UNDESA 1999), it is argued that since the late 1980s ‘in many middle-income countries the demand for women’s labour in manufacturing has been weakening, as export production became more skill- and capital-intensive’ (UNDESA 1999, p.9). As examples of this trend, the report cites Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and the *maquiladoras* in Mexico. In South Korea specifically, it notes that ‘the composition of the workforce in the electronics industry has changed in favour of male workers, as production in this sector shifted to more sophisticated communication and computer products’.

In a recent paper prepared for UNRISD, Jomo (2001) traces the trends in female employment as the manufacturing sector in different East Asian countries has gone through various structural changes over the past two decades. First, what is clear is that while the manufacturing share of total employment has begun to decline in the three first-tier East Asian newly industrialized economies (NIE) of Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea from 1971, 1981 a for the peaks in manufacturing's share of total employment, there is no clear pattern in relation to the timing.[25]

However, while the facts of de-feminisation are more or less conclusive, the mechanisms leading to it are far from clear. A number of different explanations have been offered for the observed de-feminisation of manufacturing employment. Ghosh (1999; 2001), for example, argues that the observed de-feminisation of the manufacturing labour force in East Asia may be attributed to the narrowing of the

3.4 Female employment, wages and wage gaps

The discussion so far has raised some questions about the *quality* of female employment in the export-oriented industries wheDCBT/TT4 1 Tf-05 0 0 12 329.1274/P <</MCID 1 >>BTw 1

Given these labour market trends, have gender wage gaps narrowed? The availability, reliability and interpretability

Finally, it needs to be born in mind that the kinds of mechanisms that determine the value of labour in labour

One of the contentious issues dividing feminists who are writing on this subject concerns the interpretation of women workers' voices. According to Gita Sen (1999a) the fact that young women sometimes voice a preference for this type of work to going back to the confines of rural patriarchal households only emphasizes how harsh the conditions of rural poverty and rural pa employment had been generally associated with dire economic need. Factory work, it was argued, had not altered some of the striking features of gender subordination in this context, such as women's dependence on male *protection* (even though it may have reduced their dependence on male *provision*). Nevertheless the ability to earn a wage (whether their wages disappeared into a common pool, was retained under their own management or handed over to or appropriated by household heads or other senior members), had made a difference in how women were perceived and treated, as well as their feelings of self-worth. The increased sense of power became even more visible in moments of crisis when the expanded possibilities offered by the strengthening of women's 'fall-back position' allowed them to walk out of, or not enter into, relationships that undermined their agency in unacceptable ways (Kabeer 1995, p.35).

While Kabeera(1995) did not explore the gendered patterns of shop-floor politics, Wolf (1992) argued that the increased field of manoeuvring that factory work had offered the Javanese daughters at home was matched by different and invested with different meanings and purposes by different parties. In the Hong Kong plant, Lee shows how the women workers used familial discourses as a pretext for circumventing certain managerial demands; women cited gender-based inconvenience and their mothering burdens at home to reject management demands for assignments which required cross-border commuting and overnight stays.

These fine-grained feminist accounts which provide a contextual analysis of labour f public funding and delivery of a wide range of goods and services—such as health care, education, welfare services such as day care, care for the aged, care for the retired and disabled—is vital to women who are ultimately the ones who have to balance their time and energies between income-earning activities and the care of human beings the formal sector. For these reasons social security schemes may not be the most effective vehicle for extending coverage to the majority of the population in developing countries. Instead, universalistic programs that are financed through taxation—not employment-based contributions—and with entitlements to basic benefits based on citizenship or residency criteria may h collective ones. But contrary to such expectations the administrative costs have tended to be very high and they have not declined over time. In countries like Peru and Bolivia where attempts have been made to reduce costs, it has been by sacrificing some of the benefits of the insured (by not granting minimum pensions, for example). The fourth assumption was that of *capital accumulation* and increase in national savings. The reality is that even where there has been significant capital accumulation—as high as 40 per cent of GDP at the end of 1998 in the much-touted Chilean case—it needs to be interpreted with two important caveats in mind. First, the figures for capital accumulation are gross figures; fiscal costs must be deducted so as to show the net balance. To continue with the Chilean example, the net return has been estimated to be negative (annual rate segmented, and not dominated by private care, are easier to universalize. Conversely, systems dominated by private fee-for-service provision are extremely hard to universalize. This is another reason why the current trends towards privatization are so worrying (Mackintosh 2000).

Community provision: There has been an enormous emphasis over the past ten years in the economics literature on ‘social capital’, ‘personalized networks’ and ‘trust’. As Mackintosh (2000) puts it, by and large this literature highlights the greater ease of sustaining cooperation and reciprocal trust in small communities than in large-scale impersonal interactions. These analyses facilitate the policy shifts towards decentralization and community involvement in health care provision. The emphasis on cooperation within small communities, however, obscures the sharp divisions within small communities, and the difficulties of achieving redistributive outcomes within small communities. Indeed there is often a theory-driven confusion between *collaboration* and *equity*—which are not the same (Mackintosh 2000). One of the outcomes of the emphasis on collaboration and trust has been to marginalize issues of redistribution. What is needed are more systematic explorations of the conditions for effective *redistributive* behaviour by governments, service providers, funding institutions and communities. That problem seems practically absent from the policy debate (Mackintosh 2000).

Targeting: The current social policy and development mindset is also enamoured with ‘safety nets’ and ‘targeting’. Targeted schemes, however, are very difficult to implement, demanding well-established and legitimate administrative structures. Ironically, these were the very arguments on the basis of which neoliberals dismissed strategic industrial policies, alleging that governments do not have the information and the capacity to implement selective industrial policies. But in their enthusiastic embrace of targeted welfare schemes these advocates seem to have forgotten their own reasoning (which would be even more relevant to targeting of poor *individuals*). Moreover, there is no evidence for the underlying assumption that targeted public provision is the way to achieve greater inclusion. Targeting and means testing are likely to produce—on the contrary—increasing inequality.

Critics allege that the models of import substitution industrialization (ISI) that shaped labour market conditions in many developing countries prior to the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s did not in fact guarantee the universal coverage of social rights. Not only was the entire *working* population not covered by its legal and social provisions—in particular those engaged in voluntary work, care work or community work, who were largely excluded—but a significant part of labour in the developing world never gained the wide spectrum of rights that became institutionalised under the European welfare states. This was particularly the case as far as women are concerned. In India, for examppt

In response we would argue that while it is imperative to recognize the shortcomings of the Keynesian development model that dominated development thinking in the so-called ‘golden age’ of ca most marked among the institutionalized we constructive approach would have been to extend their achievements and to change their less successful interventions so as to make them perform better, rather than to reverse their gains. A gender-sensitive approach to social policy and to macro-economic policy more broadly must start from the premise that women have a different relation to employment than men; approaches that premise social rights and entitlements on labour market contributions will remain gender biased given that for the majority of women their labour market contribution has to be interwoven with their care obligations (they thus work part-time, and withdraw from the labour market during some periods of their lives when they are intensively involved in care activities). Thus social entitlements based on citizenship or re

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