


THE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS OF LANDLOCKEDNESS:


THE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS OF LANDLOCKEDNESS:


Understanding the development costs of being landlocked




e biggest challenge of LLDCs is trading with a third country ... while bi-lateral trade is important most LLDCs can only trade with a third country after having its goods transit through a neighbouring country to a port with additional border crossings. As a result, the impact on trade is big.

Gravity models of bilateral trade broadly support this view (see, inter alia, Limao and Venables, 2001; Rose, 2002; Raballand, 2003; Martinez-Zarzoso and Marquez-Ramos, 2005; Coulibaly and Fontagnee 2000@)Jying intuition is pretty straightforward. Transport routes are more expensive and dessee LLDCs. is increases transport costs, thus making trade more costly and least proper the parties involved. In this regard, it is immediately obvious that if trade or economic integration is a fundamental cause of development, then landlockedness is likely to adversely aect development by making trade more di










Table 4. Structural breaks associated with the launch of the APoA				
Manufacturing share	15.72	-4.49	0.010	
Exports concentration	0.419	0.018	0.356	
Primary commodity exports	81.14	-11.45	0.143	
Export dependency	31.22	5.51	0.071	
Import dependency	33.45	10.26	0.031	
Service share	49.13	3.14	0.113	

Source: OHRLLS Calculations.

Stylized fact 2: When measured as a proportion of GDP, international trade ows in LLDCs are not systematically smaller than in other groups. However, the export structure of LLDCs is generally less direction to rely on the export of primary commodities more heavily than any other group. To some extent, this lack outside the continuous statement of the continuous s

Table 5. Days to export							
Landlocked developing	49	49	48	48	46	44	43
Transit developing	30	27	26	25	24	23	23
All developing	32	30	29	28	27	26	26
World	28	26	25	25	24	23	23

Source: World Bank, Doing Business Report 2012

On the positive side, however, one should note the reduction in export delays. In all groups the time to export has declined since 2005 by 5 to 7 days. LLDCs are no exception (the reduction is 6 days), which suggests that at least in terms of overall trend they have improved. However, the LLDCs still take almost double the number of days that transit developing countries take.

Table 8. E ciency of customs clearance procedures (1=low to 5-high)					
	2007	2010			
Landlocked developing	2.02815	2.17960			
Transit developing	2.44091	2.37824			
All developing	2.30641	2.33817			
Developed	3.21081	3.21341			
World	2.55134	2.58864			

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators

Table 9. Ease of arranging competitively priced shipment (1=low to 5=high)					
	2007	2010			
Landlocked developing	2.23370	2.59480			
Transit developing	2.58909	2.67941			
All developing	2.49205	2.69167			
Developed	3.22341	3.34126			
World	2.71221	2.84006			

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators

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
Indicators	Interpretation/De

Table 12. Share of womer	in non-agi	ricultural se	ector (% of	total non-a	gricultural	employme	nt)
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2007	2008	2009
Landlocked developing	22.90	32.61	38.06	40.59	9 40.8	1 42.6	66 43.67
Transit developing	28.82	31.29	32.34	30.78	34.09	32.2	1 39.86
All developing	30.14	36.47	36.80	38.54	38.11	37.99	40.38
Developed	37.23	43.8	44.12	47.32	47.91	42.15	43.13
World	35.22	39.45	39.54	41.25	41.18	41.36	44.08

Source: United Nations Statistical Database


Similarly, youth literacy in LLDCs is higher than in transit countries, even though it still lower than in coastal developing countries and below the average for all developing countries of girls to boys in primary is also higher in LLDCs than in transit countries, albeit only marginally.


Figure 17. Youth literacy rate (% of population ages 15-24)



Source: United Nations Statistical Database

Indicators of health outcomes provide instead a more negative picture. LLDCs still have the highest rate of infant and maternal mortality and the highest prevalence of HIV in the population. In spite of **thansige**cline in the last twenty years, infant mortality in LLDCs remains above 5%, whilst it is 3% in the coastal developing economies and around 3.5% in the average developing countries. Maternal mortality in LLDCs is almost 80% higher than in coastal economy and almost 20% higher than in transit economies. For HIV prevalence there is no evidence of the gap between LLDCs and other regions closing down.





Source: United Nations Development Programme.

Table 14 indicates that human development indicators generally improved in the period following the launch of APoA. is is clearly in line with what is observed in regard to macroeconomic performance (and the same caution must be used before interpreting theadings as indicative of a causaliect).

Table 14. Structural breaks in human development associated with APoA launch					
	mean before even)(change in mean§(p-value		
Girls/Boys primary education	83.34	7.25	0.235		
Share of women outside agriculture	33.65	4.59	0.142		
Youth literacy rate	81.31	5.62	0.319		
Poverty headcount	47.31	-10.13	0.055		
Infant mortality	79.92	-23.16	0.001		
Maternal mortality	515.34	-100.13	0.003		
Prevalence of HIV	5.03	0.55	0.654		

Source: OHRLLS Calculations.

Stylized fact 5: Landlocked developing countries tend to have worse health outcomes and higher poverty headcount the other groups. However, in terms of gender parity and youth literactyp signess has been achieved since 2000 and the LLDCs today perform better than the transit countries. Overall human development is still lower in LLDCs than in the average developing counteryperiod after the launch of APoA is characterised by an increase in the average of many of the human development indicators.

Table 15. Control of corru	ption						
Landlocked developing	-0.658	-0.68	4 -0.75	2 -0.6	B5 -0.6	65 -0.	679 -0.6
Transit developing	-0.392	-0.429	-0.524	-0.49	3 -0.40	68 -0.5	22 -0.5
All developing	-0.411	-0.415	-0.385	-0.382	2 -0.37	1 -0.30	69 -0.36
World	-0.020	-0.033	-0.032	-0.032	-0.027	-0.020	0.021

Source: World Bank Governance Indicators Database

Table 16. Government æ	ctiveness						
Landlocked developing	-0.791	-0.737	-0.77	8 -0.72	20 -0.70	4 -0.688	-0.67
	-0.367	-0.429	-0.475	-0.46	6 -0.465	-0.499	-0.501
All developing	-0.410	-0.410	-0.401	-0.391	-0.387	-0.381	-0.383
World	-0.020	-0.035	-0.034	-0.028	-0.027	-0.020	-0.020

Source: World Bank Governance Indicators Database

Table 17. Political Stabilit	у						
	-0.550	-0.650	B -0.65	3 -0.5	B5 -0.5	15 -0.	518 -0.5
	-0.638	-0.688	-0.690	0.72	1 -0.60	68 -0.6	96 -0.72
All developing	-0.365	-0.367	-0.268	-0.26	-0.25	9 -0.20	61 -0.27
World	-0.097	-0.092	-0.030	-0.029	-0.026	-0.03	-0.043

Source: World Bank Governance Indicators Database

Table 19. Rule of law							
Landlocked developing	-0.733	-0.766	-0.77	8 -0.76	6 -0.740	0 -0.756	-0.7
Transit developing	-0.543	-0.508	-0.611	-0.613	-0.599	-0.604	-0.58
All developing	-0.426	-0.413	-0.390	-0.391	-0.387	-0.396	-0.398
World	-0.052	-0.064	-0.041	-0.035	-0.029	-0.026	-0.025

Source: World Bank Governance Indicators Database

e data tell a pretty consistent story: the quality of governance in LLDCs is lower than in the other groups. Transit developing countries however present levels of governance quality relatively close to those of LLDCs and in one case political stability and violence, even lower.

In order to assess the quantitative signice of the derences in the level of the indicators, consider that the theoretical range is 5 points, but in practice indicators take values in a range of about 3.8 points, with a standard deviation not greater than 1. So a dience of 0.4 ... 0.5, as it is often observed between LLDCs and coastal developing economies, corresponds to about 15% of the actual range of the indicators or to about half a standard deviatible rences might not be too large, but they are likely to be economically meaningful.

e structural break analysis in Table 20 suggests that there is countsidire rence between the period before and after the launch of the APoA in most of the governance indicatous of law might have mildly worsened.

Table 20. Structural breaks in Governance indicators associated with APoA launch					
	-0.772	0.03	0.317		
Control of corruption	-0.662	-0.05	0.445		
Government æctiveness	-0.808	-0.011	0.412		
Political Stability	-0.553	0.023	0.275		
Regulatory Quality	-0.723	-0.014	0.402		
Rule of law	-0.731	-0.030	0.021		

Source: OHRLLS Calculations.

Stylized fact 6: Landlocked developing countries are generally characterized by lower quality of govername than the other region However, while the gap with respect to coastal economies is quite exidence, filoendihe transit economies is small. In fact, on the political stability dimension of governance, transit countries appear to perform slightly worse than the LLDCs

Population aected by natural disasters	Proportion of total population acted by droughts ods, and extreme temperature. Higher values indicate that a country is more vulnerable to natural disasters.
Organic water pollutant emissions	téortpresatuf révalter poulloutayst. Emaissidyldéstél/loga/taSn.

Table 23. Population aected by droughts, oods, extreme temperature (%)			
Landlocked developing	2.185		
Transit developing	2.205		
All developing	1.423		
World	1.170		

Source: Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT)

e data on forest land reveal that LLDCs have the highest rate of forest depletion: -11.6% sinces 1999ct signi cantly higher than the depletion rate observed in transit developing economies (e3a5%) age worldwide is close to 0 (-0.9%), con

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Table 29. Structural breaks in international capitatows associated with APoA launch				
FDI in ows	2.31	2.17	0.001	
ODA	11.32	-0.97	0.665	
ODA for trade (% of total ODA)	0.44	0.01	0.555	

Source: OHRLLS Calculations

Stylized fact 8: Landlocked developing countries receive little FDI, but this in line with the experience of most other development of the countries, landlocked or coastal. Yet there is evidence of an increase in capital ows after 2003. LLDCalso receive most al

Table 32. Intra regional-trade (average per country % of total country trade)				
Landlocked developing	18.12	19.23		
Transit developing	4.37	4.35		
All developing	11.27	12.34		
Developed	13.45	15.75		
World	12.10	13.10		

Source: WTO, UNCTAD, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics


Interestingly, the proportion of intra-regional trade is very high for LLDCs relative to the other developing countries groups. is might be a reason of concern to the extent that these high levels of trade are the result of trade diversion rather than trade creation. In other words, while for transit developing and developing countries regional integration might create trade, it is possible that for LLDCs trade is simply being diverted: trade partners outside the region are replaced with trade partners inside the region. To strengthen the positive development impact of regional integration it is necessary that LLDCs participate in RIAs that combine both internal free trade with custom unions with low tarishariers.

Following the launch of APoA in 2003 shown in table 33, the number of FTAs hæmtligimcreased, while the same is not observed for the number of RIAs beyond FTAs and for the overall share of intra-regional trade.

Table 33. Structural breaks associated with APoA launch for regional integration					
Number of FTAs	2.53	0.86	0.031		
Number of RIAs	1.51	0.21	0.334		
Intra-regional trade	17.87	2.13	0.132		

Source: OHRLLS Calculations

Stylized fact 9. FTAs and RIAs are slightly less frequent in LLDCs than in the other developing are unftired are regional trade is instead quite large, which might be a reason of concern in view of possible trade diversion



 $m \cdot \cdot \cdot - m \perp Ad \cdot \cdot \perp c \cdot$

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta l_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

(4)
$$y_{i,t} = \mathbf{a}' \mathbf{x}_{i,t} + \gamma_1 z_{1i,t} + \gamma_2 z_{2i,t} + \dots + \gamma_J z_{Ji,t} + \beta l_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

$$\mathbf{a}_{J2_{1i,t}} = \mathbf{a}_{J} \mathbf{w}_{1i,t} + b_1 l_{i,t} + \mu_{1i,t}$$

$$\vdots$$

$$\vdots$$

⁷ e traditional system estimator in the presence of endogeneity is 3 stage leastssispularonesever consistent only under the assumption of homoscedastic errors, which instead easily violated. Generalized method of moments generalizes the 3 stage leastscaptuages into the definition of the control of the c

Annex 6. De r	nition, sources, and summar	y statistics of	variables u	sed in syste	m estimatio	n
Development	Composite index of development obtained as the rst principal components of individual MDG indicators (see Appendix I for a list)		5.07	2.13	3.23	1.21
	Real per-capita income in Purchasing Power Parity US dollars (variable is log-transformed for systems estimation)	Penn World Tables	2951	4381	570	563
Institutions	Average of governance indicators: (i) voice and accountability, (ii) political stability, (iii) government e ectiveness, (iv) regulatory quality, (v) control of corruption, and (vi) rule of law	Kaufman et al (2010)	4.93	1.49	4.16	1.29
Integration	Index of economic integration measured as total exports + total imports divided by GDF		0.82	0.44	0.72	0.38
Landlocked	Dummy variable taking val 1 if country is landlocked	uleNOHRLLS	0.17	0.37	1	0
Resources	Exports of primary commodities in percent of total merchandise exports. Primary commodities include oil and fuels, metals and oreagricultural raw materials, food and beverages		0.59	0.31	0.71	0.23
Latitude	Distance from the equator	La Porta (1999)	t0a24	0.17	0.25	0.15
Population	Log of total country*s population (in millions) (variable is log-transformed for system estimation)	UNSD	30.34	123.72	9.31	10.90
Area	Log of total country•s land area (in Km2) (variable is log-transformed for system estimation)	UNSD	287085	856038	224758	192152

Notes: UNSD stands for United Nations Statistical Division, WDI stands for World Development Indicators (World Bank), U**isiahtik**LLS for United Nations O ce of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States.

27 27

Constant (a0)	-2.248	***	-3.123	***	-2.239	***	-3.142	**
Latitude (a1)	-0.099	*	-0.092		-0.077	*	-0.121	
Income (a2)	0.957	***	1.117	***	1.153	***	1.217	***
Institutions (a3)	0.156	**	0.293	**	0.149	*	0.171	**
Integration/Trade (a4)	0.634	***	0.510	*	0.317	×	0.512	**
Landlockedness (beta)	-0.57	***	-0.502	**	-0.61	4 **	-0.834	. *:
R2	0.674		0.604					
	'							

 $oldsymbol{\hat{r}}_{q,t}$

Annex 10. e development cost of being landlocked						
Afghanistan		Malawi	24.95			
Armenia	9.34	Mali	26.37			
Azerbaijan	11.24	Moldova	18.76			
Bhutan	13.19	Mongolia	15.08			
Bolivia	16.10	Nepal	16.68			
Botswana	24.15	Niger	27.58			
Burkina	23.05	Paraguay	10.94			
Burundi	29.04	Rwanda	27.10			
CAR	31.63	Swaziland	16.28			
Chad	30.71	Tajikistan	29.52			
Ethiopia	32.53	Turkmenistan	25.24			
Kazakhstan	13.76	Uganda	20.55			
Kyrygz rep	21.02	Uzbekistan	15.87			
Lao	24.12	Zambia	27.44			
Lesotho	28.68	Zimbabwe	31.00			
Macedonia		Average all countries	22.12			