

# STATEMENT BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, FRANCE, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE 2015 TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REVIEW CONFERENCE

1. As Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm our enduring commitment to the NPT, which remains indispensable to the maintenance of international peace and security. For forty-five years, the NPT has served as the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, a conduit for expanding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy amongst Parties to the Treaty, and the foundation for the collective pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
2. Every NPT State Party benefits from a strong and effective NPT regime and each can contribute to its implementation by helping to prevent proliferation, foster the safe and secure use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and create conditions conducive to nuclear disarmament. The purposes for which the NPT was established remain valid and continue to unite efforts to address current nuclear challenges. We look forward to joining with all States Parties in pursuit of common goals and pledge our strongest efforts toward a successful outcome at this ninth NPT Review Conference (RevCon).
3. We are committed to strengthening each of mutually reinforcing pillars disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These are complementary goals and should be pursued together, systematically and with equal determination across all three pillars by all States Parties. The consensus Action Plan from the 2010 RevCon was unprecedented and a result of the strengthened NPT review process adopted in 1995. We support the fullest implementation of all Action Plan recommendations and we call on all States Parties to continue working toward that end. The 2015 RevCon presents the opportunity to reaffirm that the Action Plan remains valid as a road-map, to take stock of its implementation, and to consider where consensus may be possible for further measures building upon the 2010 Action Plan.
4. As NPT nuclear-weapon States, we reaffirm the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament as referenced in the preamble and provided for in Article VI of the NPT.

the relevant recommendations of the Action Plan, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security, and based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all. We continue to believe that an incremental, step-by-step approach is the only practical option for making progress towards nuclear disarmament, while upholding global strategic security and stability. This goal is what motivates our concerted efforts to pursue practical steps toward nuclear disarmament. All States can help fulfill this goal by creating the necessary security environment through resolving regional tensions, tackling proliferation challenges, promoting collective security, and making progress in all areas of disarmament.

5. As detailed in our respective national reports to the 2015 Review Conference, there has been very substantial progress on Article VI. The Cold War nuclear arms race has ended. Global stocks of nuclear weapons are at their lowest point in over half a century as the result of unprecedented efforts on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. When fully implemented, the New START Treaty will result in the lowest number of deployed nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia since the 1950s.

6. We underline the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and Action 3 of the 2010 Action Plan in a manner that promotes international stability and security. We stress that addressing further prospects for nuclear disarmament would require

8. Since the UK initiated the P5 process in 2009, we have held six conferences to foster dialogue, transparency and common approaches to strengthening the NPT. France plans to host the seventh conference. Each conference has built on the last and helps lay the groundwork for further steps. We continue to

through P5 dialogue and action. In this regard, we agreed on a common reporting framework in 2014 under and completed a first edition of a leadership. This edition will be released during the Review Conference and a side event will be held to introduce our efforts in this regard. The P5 intend to revise and update the Glossary as appropriate in due course. Also in this regard, we have increased our engagement with the wider disarmament community, including by meeting with non-nuclear weapon states as part of the most recent P5 Conference in London and continuing P5 engagement with civil society.

9. Our commitment to nuclear disarmament extends to efforts to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force at an early date. We look forward to the 9<sup>th</sup> Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT to be held in September in New York. We urge all states that have not done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible to bring about its entry into force. We take this opportunity to reaffirm our own moratoria on nuclear weapons- entry into force, and call on other states to do likewise. The CTBT constrains the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and thereby provides an effective disarmament and nonproliferation measure. We further note that nuclear stockpile maintenance programs are and will remain consistent with NPT obligations. We emphasize the very substantial efforts made in achieving the cessation of the nuclear arms race as called for in Article VI of the NPT and affirm our intention never to resume such an arms race.

10. We are working closely with the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization in Vienna on the development verification regime, including its International Monitoring System, International Data Centre, and On-Site Inspection. S







21. We strongly support measures to assure access to nuclear fuel, such as the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Reserve in the Russian Federation, the American Assured Fuel Supply, and the UK Assurance of Supply of Enrichment Services. We note the importance of establishing the IAEA low-enriched uranium (LEU) bank. These contributions promote achievement of sustainable development and energy security goals and benefit all NPT States Parties.

22. We reaffirm our support of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Zangger Committee. These two international export control mechanisms play an important role by providing the assurance that nuclear suppliers need to facilitate the greatest possible exchange of nuclear material, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes. It is essential that export control lists and guidelines are kept up-to-date, taking into account the evolution of nuclear technology and nuclear proliferation developments. We welcome the efforts of the NSG in this regard. We encourage all States Parties to adopt export control guidelines and reiterate our readiness to provide assistance as States Parties may request.

23. Nuclear safety and security are critical to the future of nuclear energy. We reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of states in accordance with their respective obligations and the central role of the IAEA in international cooperation in these fields. We welcome the efforts to draw lessons from the tragic Fukushima accident, offer our full support to implementation of

to better meet the growing needs in capacity building, in particular to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

24. While States Parties have the right to withdraw from the NPT, such a withdrawal must be done in accordance with Article X of the Treaty. States Parties should support recommendations to prevent abuse of the NPT withdrawal provision. We note in this regard the role of the UN Security Council in

recall that a state remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal, and such withdrawal would not affect any other legal obligation of the withdrawing state to other States Parties. At the same time, we are convinced that any decision taken by this Conference in relation to withdrawal from the NPT should not lead to the revision of Article X, re-open the text of the Treaty, or undermine the commonly recognized principles and norms of international law. P5 have agreed to make efforts to broaden consensus among NPT State Parties on issues of procedures and consequences of withdrawal at the 2015 RevCon.

25. We attach great importance to achieving the universality of the NPT. We urge those States that are not Parties to the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States and pending accession to the NPT, to adhere to its terms. We stand ready to work with Parties to engage the non-Parties with a view to achieving this goal.

26. As we rededicate ourselves to the NPT and its three mutually reinforcing pillars – disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy – we also pledge our support for efforts to ensure the Review Conference builds on the success of the 2010 Action Plan and encourages further cooperation on steps to strengthen all three pillars of the NPT.