2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

27 April 2015


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Nuclear disarmament

Working paper submitted by Egypt





obligations under the Treaty. While action 5 of the Plan of Action adopted at the 2010 Review Conference clearly refers to the implementation by nuclear-weapon States of the 13 Practical Steps, no progress has been realized in that regard to date.

- 5. The 2010 Plan of Action identified specific actions that nuclear-weapon States have to take in order to promote nuclear disarmament, including actions 20 and 21 on reporting on implementation and transparency measures. Along with other relevant action points, those remain to be implemented.
- 6. As with each of the other main pillars of the Treaty, the implementation of commitments in the field of nuclear disarmament had to be linked to progress in other more overarching goals, namely treaty universality, a crucial objective to which the decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty was linked.
- 7. Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing elements, and each of the objectives would be of limited value if implemented without the other.
- 8. Through conferences convened in Oslo in March 2013, in Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014, and in Vienna in December 2014, the humanitarian consequences process managed to bring to the attention of the international community, more than at any other time, that nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons remain not only core obligations of nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty, but also are urgent requirements of international humanitarian law and action that are to be expected from the civilized international community in the twenty-first century.
- 9. The Government of Egypt has therefore strongly endorsed the negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention that would aim at the realization of the total and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, under effective multilateral verification and control. The 2010 Plan of Action mentioned the convention as a viable route to nuclear disarmament and the 2015 Review Conference needs to build on that. If necessary, a first step towards that objective can be the negotiation of a treaty banning the manufacture, possession, transfer and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
- 10. In that regard, the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body within the United Nations system is to be preserved and utilized. It is of critical importance that the Conference on Disarmament, while moving forward on a legal instrument banning and/or seeking to totally eliminate nuclear weapons, should begin negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or fissile material cut-off treaty, in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, within an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.
- 11. In order for a fissile material cut-off treaty to contribute to nuclear disarmament, it should cover all existing fissile material stocks and should create conditions under which nuclear-weapon States will not be able to produce more nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

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Actions required by the Conference

The Conference should review the implementation of obligations of nuclear-weapon States in the field of nuclear disarmament, under the Treaty, taking into account relevant obligations adopted at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, and decide on necessary measures for the full implementation of Treaty obligations. In that context, the Conference should:

- 1. Recall existing nuclear disarmament obligations emanating from the Treaty, as well as related measures agreed at Review Conferences, that are yet to be implemented, reaffirm such obligations and recognize that the lack of implementation undermines the effectiveness of the Treaty, its credibility and the potential for the realization of its eventual universality.
- 2. Reaffirm the mutually reinforcing relationship between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, both vertical and horizon

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note that nuclear-weapon States have achieved little progress in that regard, and note that actions are needed on their behalf, individually and collectively, including in the context of military alliances, to eliminate practices of nuclear sharing and to realize that nuclear deterrence runs contrary to their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty as well as to its overall aspirations, and call on nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations in that domain.

- 9. Realize the urgency of launching negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning nuclear weapons, as a first step in efforts to initiate negotiations in the Conference on a nuclear weapons convention, which would aim at the realization of the total and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, under effective multilateral verification and control.
- 10. Recognize the importance of reaching an agreement on a comprehensive and balanced programme of work by the Conference on Disarmament, which, while moving forward on a legal instrument banning and/or seeking to totally eliminate nuclear weapons, should begin negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or fissile material cut-off treaty, in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, allowing the consideration of all issues comprehensively and effectively.
- 11. Affirm that in order for a fissile material cut-off treaty to effectively contribute to its nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, it must cover all existing fissile material stocks, placing such materials under safeguards, in order to prevent any further production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

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