


POLICIES AND REGULATIONS FOR MANAGING SKILLED INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FOR WORK

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Figure 1. Percent of U.S. Recent Immigrants and non-EU Immigrants with Tertiary Education



1. *Hard numerical caps*—A high score (4 points) is given if admission numbers are fixed and small numbers permitted; declining points are given if numbers are fixed but generous, or there is an ability to periodically adjust numbers, or there are no caps at all.
2. *Strict labour market test*—A high ranking score is given if there is a strong test of the labour market, i.e., a lack of available native workers; declining points are given if

Figure 2. Ranking of Index of Controlled/Competitive Temporary



Figure 3. Ranking of the Index of Controlled/Competitive Permanent Skilled Worker Programs




Table 1. Indexes of Country Share of Tertiary Educated Adults by Nationality, Ratios Relative to National Averages, and Ranking Indexes, 2001

Country	Share of Adults Completing Tertiary Education		Adjult Population Tertiary Educated	Ratios			Indexes		
	Nationals %	Foreigners %		Immigrant Selectivity	Nationals Selectivity	Immigrant Share	Immigrant Selectivity	Nationals Selectivity	Immigrant Share
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) = (2) / mean	(5) = (2) / (1)	(6) = (3) / total	(7) = 100 top ratio	(8) = 100 top ratio	(9) = 100 top ratio
Australia	20.4	27.5	458	114	135	201	66	48	100
Austria	15.8	14.5	83	60	92	87	35	33	43
Belgium	28.5	22.2	49	92	78	41	53	28	20
Canada	16.6	22.9	703	95	138	189	55	49	94
Denmark	20.0	23.5	47	97	118	75	56	42	37
Finland	32.6	24.8	20	102	76	33	59	27	17
France	23.8	14.4	259	59	61	37	34	22	18
Germany	23.7	14.6	624	60	62	64	35	22	32
Greece	17.3	18.0	99	74	104	80	43	37	40
Ireland	20.4	23.8	14	98	117	32	57	42	16
Italy	8.5	23.8	235	98	280	34	57	100	17
Japan	15.0	23.8	310	98	159	21	57	57	10
Luxemborg	16.7	20.9	6	86	125	113	50	45	56
Netherlands	24.5	23.0	254	95	94	134	55	33	67
New Zealand	16.0	23.8	71	98	149	157	57	53	78
Norway	33.7	41.0	69	169	122	130	98	43	65
Portugal	9.2	12.7	17	52	138	14	30	49	7
Spain	23.8	30.1	190	124	126	40	72	45	20
Sweden	25.7	29.8	156	123	116	148	71	41	74
Switzerland	25.9	23.3	114	96	90	132	56	32	66
United Kingdom	28.5	41.9	556	173	147	79	100	52	39
United States	32.1	28.6	6,348	118	89	189	68	32	94
Average	23.3	24.2	10,095	100	104	100	58	37	50

Figure 4. Combined Index of Skilled Immigrant Competitiveness





Table 2. Employment Rate for The Highly Skilled (Tertiary Educated Workers), 2001

Foreigner

Figure 5. Index of Foreign Employment Rate Relative to Foreign Average ,
2001



Source: see table 2.

(a) *Global labour markets generate domestic demand*—Multinational corporations, communications, and transportation make for global labour markets, and governments should facilitate legitimate employer demand for international workers. Meeting legitimate employer demand is in everyone's best economic interests.

- Admission processes should be timely—Employers should be able to identify and hire foreign workers in a few weeks time. Pre-screening systems are one way to facilitate the process, as are responsible recruitment agencies, although neither may move as fast as word of mouth.

- Work permit requirements should not be onerous—Point systems and other means of facilitating fast admissions are alluring. But any fast track system that lacks a means of dynamic market testing is, ultimately, flawed. Arguably, in a computer age, the lag time that apparently inheres in market testing reflects problems in administrative creativity and management capacity.

- Administrative capacity needs to be front and center—Immigration consult(on)2 7 1 Tf0.4nir

(b) *Abuse happens*—Today’s debate over immigration policy for skilled workers, coming of age in the past decade of “New Economy” exuberance, CEO excesses, and the erosion of labour institutions, tends to be bereft of traditional commitments to working conditions. Most employers are good actors, but exploitation will occur unless it is combated.

- *All admission programmes should specify labour conditions*—Wages and working conditions that protect domestic and foreign workers need to be spelled out up front, whether or not government agencies pre-certify the elements of a job offer or rely on post-hire enforcement.
- *Admission numbers should be dynamic*—The tried and true lesson of immigration is that, once started, it generates its own momentum and demand. There must be some means of testing demand and adjusting numbers accordingly or excess supply will have its adverse impacts. Market testing is one means, but serious consideration needs be given to economists’ calls for auctions and other innovations.
- *Enforcement must be integral for long-term success*—This review identified many on-the-book laws, but uncovered little evidence that immigrant programmes are adequately monitored. Failure to sanction abuse, even if no more than say 10 per cent of the actors involved, will undercut national workers and create an uneven playing field for business. In the long run abuse harms competitiveness and generates backlash.

Temporary migration is ok—History shows that temporary work programmes always lead to some permanent stays, but it also shows that most migrants are happy to take temporary work. It is both ethical and practical to insist on temporary work agreements.

- Workable temporary programmes are temporary—There should be up-front and transparent expectations of short stays; no more than one to three years. Spouse working rights and that of dependants should vary with length of stay and the nature of employment.
- Avenues to permanency should be available and transparent—Employers should be able to keep the exceptional foreign worker. Temporary workers should not be barred from permanent admission; rather the terms of their admission should encourage return, while the exceptional worker may be given priority status for permanency.
- Temporary programmes that encourage return are a plus for sending countries—As the volume of temporary migration from sending countries increases, so too does the risk of brain drain. Research indicates that high rates of return and circulation are the best way for skilled mobility to stimulate economic development in sending countries; and there are a number of policy options to facilitate return.

