

PROVISION FOR POST-PROJECT EVALUATIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DEMOCRACY FUND Contract NO.PD:C0110/10

EVALUATION REPORT



UDF-COL-07-203- PROYECTO ARTICULO 40 (Colombia)

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Acknowledgements

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I. Executive Summary

(i) Project Data

3 3 U R \ H F W R S U W & F M R F W) \$ Wald & Fwo-Mear initiative implemented by Misión Observación Electoral (MOE). The project was active from 1 October, 2008 to 31 January, 2011, including a four-month extension. This was a USD 1.4M project, supported by an UNDEF grant of USD 350,000 with additional financial support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Ford Foundation, the British Embassy in Bogota, the United

between actors from different backgrounds is unknown. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (iv), and (v).

f The project was generally implemented to a high standard . It brought a unique and innovative approach to elections, with results contributing to increased access to information and demand for governmental accountability, political transparency, and judicial reforms related to election processes. However, the project did little to concretely change the political culture of beneficiaries, especially at the local level; This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii).

f Improved knowledge on electoral risks turned out to be of great strategic importance, and is a key result underscoring the relevance and effectiveness of the project as a whole . However, more comparisons with electoral local practices which are not typically recorded in statistics would be useful. This conclusion follows from findings (vi).

f The project focused on the accessibility of public information to improve civic participation and public accountability. It established a precedent with respect to data analysis and raised civic awareness, working with CSO networks and university platforms across the country. It definitely opens a window for future electoral observations. This conclusion follows from findings (vi).

f The project has had a direct impact but its contribution to sustainable changes is more debatable. The project primarily tracked activities and outcomes, which is insufficient to determine how has the governmental accountability improved on elections organization and more generally on democracy issues. This conclusion follows from findings (vi).

(iv) Recommendations

f The project was relevant and well implemented during the electoral period, but follow -up is essential to consolidate results after elections are finished. Especially because they are, by their nature, intermittent, continuous democratic monitoring and lobbying activities on electoral reforms would enhance SURMHFW¶ results. It is therefore recommended that MOE seek post-election support to sustain civic motivation and to track progress in terms not only of elections but also of democratic principles. This recommendation follows from conclusions (i), (iii), (v), and (vii).

f It is recommended that MOE consolidate and seek local partners for enhanced synergies in its activities. For such a project, the UNDEF grant recipient should consolidate partners and implementers within one integrated program, producing joint products and branding the project to provide a unifying focus for civil society voices and agents of change. For example, research activities such as the production of electoral risk maps by academics could benefit from the experience of social organizations and vice versa. This type of approach could be valuable in local areas, as it would reduce the gaps between elites and citizens and provide tangible evidence of their participation. This recommendation follows from conclusions (i), (ii), and (iii).

f Data with a greater focus on local electoral practices and the capacities of beneficiaries would be required to change political culture. Data from electoral risk maps would need to be analytically compared with local realities and practices which are not systematically reported in official statistical data. Data and methodology should be updated at regular intervals, including after elections, so as to document progress in following up on electoral processes and original complaints. This recommendation follows from conclusion (iii) and (iv).

f MOE should widen the electoral scope of the project. It is recommended that the project widen its focus to include local elections, while continuing its work at the national level. Civic action to mitigate local electoral risks in 2011 could have made a real difference in breaking the cycle of conflict and corruption in which many municipalities are trapped. Close domestic and international scrutiny could have been crucial in generating confidence in results and preventing electoral violence. Observers should particularly have been deployed in municipalities at high risk of political violence and/or electoral fraud. This recommendation follows from conclusion (v).

f Use a results-based performance monitoring plan to track progress with respect to electoral reform s. This could measure changes in media access to information or the performance of governmental initiatives in the field in relation to identified electoral risks. Such a plan should be also used to track legal and institutional changes related to issues affecting the quality of elections, including security threats, handling of complaints, and transparency in campaign financing. This recommendation follows from conclusions (vi) and (vii).

II. Introduction and development context


(i) The project and evaluation objectives

Proyecto A U W L F X O'Roject 'Article 40' was a two-year initiative implemented by Misión Observación Electoral (MOE). The project was active from 1 October, 2008 to 31 January, 2011, including a four-month extension. This was a USD 1.4M project, supported by an UNDEF grant of USD 350,000 (of which USD 25,000 was used by UNDEF for monitoring and evaluation), with additional financial support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Ford Foundation, the British Embassy in Bogota, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the District Institute for Communal Action in Co-financing. The project goal was to strengthen the quality of civic participation and public accountability by creating spaces for non-partisan dialogue between civil society actors and political leaders. It engaged the country through 22 implementing partners, including university platforms, civil society organizations (CSOs), research centers, and social organizations at national and local levels.

The project strategy was framed around seven intended outcomes: (i) establishment of a network of local observatories on democracy, analyzing political and electoral information at regional, national and local scales; (ii) implementation of public opinion surveys focused on issues on the political agenda; (iii) monitoring of the regional and national print media with respect to topics on the political agenda; (iv) a communications campaign centered on political rights; (v) production of training and informational materials about political rights for citizens; (vi) round table discussions, workshops, and forums about electoral issues, geared toward making proposals at the local level; and (vii) election monitoring.

UNDEF and Transtec have agreed on a framework to govern the evaluation process, set out in the Operational Manual. Accordingly WKHREMHFWLYHRIWKHHYDOXDWLI in-depth analysis of UNDEF-funded projects to gain a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project which will in turn help UNDEF devise future project strategies. Evaluations also assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipated project outputs have been achieved.

(ii) Logical framework
The table below illustrates the logic of project interventions, framed around seven intended outcomes:



IV. Evaluation findings

(i) Relevance The project objective 2 i.e., to generate data and create spaces for dialogue among citizens 2 was entirely

messages. By providing free publication of information and surveys and free coverage of events for the public information campaign, the media created opportunities for raising public awareness of the main electoral challenges.

(ii) Effectiveness MOE brought most of its intended outcomes, as laid out in the project document, to fruition. As should be expected given the indicators pertaining to justice, political reform, congressional and presidential elections, and local and regional media were used to track the quality of information on issues affecting the validity of elections.

The broad array of activities ² involving many actors at local and national scales ² gave MOE a solid basis for awareness -raising and discussions with national and local officials. The results of data analyses in combination with round table recommendations were used to focus specifically on actions that could have been taken

Activities planned Activities delivered MOE dissemination policy after each activity

A network of electoral observatories that generate national, regional, and local information

(iii) Efficiency

Although the project was delayed for four months due to internal political dynamics in Colombia, its efficiency and cost-benefit ratio, given a modest and reasonable UNDEF budget, were highly satisfactory. MOE carried out a range of activities relevant to civic electoral needs, covering a highly diverse profile of voters.

The quality of the relationship between MOE and implementing partner organizations and other factors contributed WR WKH SURMHFW¶V HILLFLHQF\

Project management was very efficient. All methodological approaches by MOE and its

partners were designed and planned in detail. Requisite methodologies, measures to assure internal consistency, and the distribution of responsibilities were clearly established and based on the characteristics and requirements of specific activities. The project benefited from the MOE network at national and local scales, and from the skills and expertise of each partner. The choice of partner organizations was also judicious, with implementation of specific activities matched to skills and competenc

that it could not ensure the continuity of activities once UNDEF funds expired, MOE proposed a series of national measures to mitigate passive and active electoral risks, as well as structural changes.

However, these recommendations have not yet been implemented by authorities. The lack of adequate data on significant electoral changes makes it difficult to identify or measure the extent to which results are sustainable or to what extent MOE recommendations, in particular, have led to sustainable improvements. It is important to keep in mind that, less than nine months after project conclusion, 41 candidates were killed in the run-up to local elections held in October 2011.

Electoral maps issued by the Ministry of the Interior are not made public and needed structural changes for justice and political reform, as advocated by MOE round tables and international donors such as SIDA and UNDP, have not yet been adopted. Challenges also remain in terms of collaboration with URIEL. It is unclear precisely what happens when complaints are passed on to the institutions responsible for addressing them. Information on the status of complaints is not yet made public in a way that is easy to access and understand.

The ownership and empowerment of partners and civil society actors are also difficult to assess, in particular after elections are finished. Moreover, the extent of relationships and interactions among different civil society actors are unclear. In Medellin, the regional coordinator declared that more local support was needed after elections to empower civic actors to change the political culture. Most electoral observers are committed only during elections, and consider the job complete once results are in. Platforms aimed at empowering civil society to participate continuously in the monitoring of democracy require greater effort before, during, and after elections.

Most interviewees also pointed out that risks are mainly identified at regional levels but most MOE recommendations are aimed toward national authorities.

The project has certainly laid the foundation for real change, but needs to be bolstered by post-election follow-up activities, or benefits may be lost.

Security, governance, and the quality of civic participation are interconnected elements of democratic consolidation. Sustainable progress will depend in large part on the effective commitment of governmental resources to provide efficient mechanisms for rapid response in all of those DUHDV 0XFK ZLOO GHSHQG RQ WKH guarantee free and fair elections through the presence of strong institutions (e.g., military, police, judges, and prosecutors) at national and local scales and on citizens' participation in governance.

(vi) UNDEF added value

It was widely recognized that UNDEF added value to this project. MOE and the main partners felt that UNDEF funding allowed MOE, for the first time, to develop its qualitative activities through the development of innovative, informative approaches to assuring democratic functioning.

Gathering and analyzing political facts with electoral risk maps and media monitoring during the electoral period is a sensitive issue in Colombia, and all partners felt that UNDEF support enhanced MOE credibility not only with government officials, but also with partners from different backgrounds.

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level. There is scope for the MOE project to continue and even to be deepened with respect to social organizations at the local level, particularly if these can provide additional evidence on risks or electoral violations. For such a project, the UNDEF grant recipient

should be in place with partners to provide direction in continuing work. This would help sustain gains and maintain momentum generated by the project, especially at the local level. This recommendation follows from conclusion (ii) (iii) and (vii).

VII. Overall assessment and closing thoughts

Annex 2: Documents Reviewed

- o Project programming and management documents:
 - Project Document;
 - Mid-term Report
 - Final report:
- o Publications produced within the framework of the project
 - MOE, Mapas y Factores de Riesgo Electoral 2011;
 - MOE, Cartilla A, Sistema electoral, Elecciones generales, January 2010;
 - MOE, Cartilla C, Irregularidades y delitos electorales , January 2010;
 - MOE, Cartilla D, Dia Electoral guia para observatores, January 2010;
 - MOE, Cartilla F, Formularios electorales, MOE, March 2010;
 - MOE, Cartilla G, Financiamento Electoral en Colombia, March 2010;
 - MoE, Kit de analysis, elecciones presidenciales y legislativas 2010;
 - MoE, percepcion electoral de los votantes colombianos, January 2011;
 - MOE, Cuadro de observaciones ley estatutaria 1475 de 2011 reforma Politica-Resisada por Corte Constitutional C-490/11, 2011;
 - MOE, Electionnes Autoridades Locales, Colombia, 2011;
 - Agenda Political 2010, Una vision desde élites estratégicas de columbia, Octobre 2009:
 - MOE, Justice reform media monitoring;
 - MOE, Political reform media monitoring;

4 June (Bogota)

20 June (Medellin)				
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Annex 4: Abbreviations

CSO	Civil Society Organizations	
['] EU		l