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Africa is aware of the multifaceted and multidimensional global challenges it must overcome to lay the foundations of its development. A sound planning and results-oriented policies and actions, will be catalyst to the transformation of our continent.

2013 marked the 50th anniversary of the birth of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and presented an opportunity for the continent to take stock of the key milestones of the past 50 years and to plan for the next 50 years. The OAU was the earliest institutionalised post-colonial expression of Pan-Africanism and there is overwhelming recognition that it brought much success to the continent at a difficult epoch, although current challenges remain: elusive peace and security, poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment.

In line with the vision of the founding fathers of independent Africa we pledged to craft a continental plan for the next fifty years, which we call Africa Agenda 2063, to ensure transformation and sustainable development for future generations. This Framework is intended to be the lodestar of all our actions as member states, governments, civil society including business and labour, women, youth and all the peoples of the continent.

Consultations have been held across the continent and in the Diaspora, in which we asked the following questions to Africans from all walks of life and formations: What Africa do we want? How do we build this Africa? And lastly, what role will we play towards the realisation of this dream?

Agenda 2063 builds on previous initiatives by generations of African leaders and their peoples, from the formation of the OAU, through the Monrovia Declaration (1979), the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1981), to the establishment of the African Union (AU) and NEPAD (2001).

The NEPAD Program was the first framework that focused on the values of Partnership (at national, regional, and international level), Leadership (by enhancing the dimension of governance, and Ownership (by affirming the importance of internal resources).

The NEPAD Agency is playing an important role in the design and consultations on the framework for Agenda 2063. We appreciate its role as a 'knowledge institution', bringing its expertise and networks to bear, and in the process providing much needed support to the work of the African Union Commission (AUC), the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and member states.



Agenda 2063 must reflect the commitment of Africa to have results-based oriented policies and operational instruments that will accelerate its economic and social transformation, and as a result, will benefit all citizens.

The transformative dimension of Agenda 2063 must influence our actions, our national plans, sub-regional and continental development initiatives, to promote the emergence of strong economies with sustained growth and sustainable capabilities of generating wealth and decent jobs.

Therefore, we welcome the NEPAD Agency's initiative to publish a monograph that presents an alternative narrative on Africa's development trajectory; explores internal and external factors that present challenges and opportunities for the people of the continent in their quest for a better life; outlines alternative policy scenarios and their projected outcomes; and considers the interface between regional and continental initiatives and implementation by member states; and guided by a blueprint that we encourage the agency to develop, in order to support the design, implementation, coordination and monitoring of the agenda.

There is a clear recognition that no progress can be attained if the leaders and peoples of the continent do not think and act with a long-term perspective, and that Agenda 2063 has to be an endogenous effort crafted and owned by Africans. It is our hope that it will also be an important guide and reference for Africa as it engages with its partners and other long-term global development initiatives.

President Republic of Senegal

On the occasion of the celebrations commemorating the founding of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa – Ethiopia, on May 2013, Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU) requested the African Union Commission (AUC) to lead the development of a continental Agenda 2063

The AUC has been working closely with the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) and is supported by the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in preparing a framework that is expected to be finalised by mid-2014.

As part of its preparations for contributing to these efforts the NPCA's Directorate for Strategy and Knowledge Management has commissioned research papers and hosted a High-Level Expert Group Seminar in Magaliesburg, South Africa, in December 2013.


The NEPAD Agency's findings are being published in this Monograph and will be widely circulated to Governments, regional institutions, social partners, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and other relevant stakeholders. They form part of the technical analysis undertaken for consideration in the formulation of the draft Framework documents.

The Monograph is divided into two sections. Part A consists of a synthesis that offers a broad framing of the historical and contemporary issues that should accompany the proposed African Agenda 2063. It identifies some of the possible challenges to which the Agenda must respond; the existing policy and institutional pillars into which it fits and on which it must build; and a broad menu of issues, which would need to be further reflected upon towards its fully-fledged articulation.

A set of background papers, annexed to this synthesis, offers a more in-depth assessment of some of these issues as a foretaste of the kind of further technical work that is being carried out in the course of the articulation of a robust continental Agenda 2063. These background papers do not present a literature survey, but are concerned with specific issues affecting the continent's prospects, including socio-economic transformation, demographic transition, governance, and the interface between Agenda 2063 and national plans, sub-regional initiatives and regional goals.

Part B explores scenarios and forecasts of Africa's performance under different policy interventions over the next 50 years. After exploring the trends in African development on the current path, this paper turns to a very preliminary exploration of broad policy interventions across major issue areas. The authors judge the impact of the alternative policy choices against three key outcome variables: human development, poverty reduction, and overall economic output. The integrated policy analysis


THE NEPAD AGENCY'S MANDATE IS TO:




Facilitate and coordinate the implementation of continental and regional priority programmes and projects



Mobilise resources and partners in support of the implementation of Africa's priority programmes and projects




Conduct and coordinate research and knowledge management



Monitor and evaluate the implementation of programmes and projects

Advocate on the AU and NEPAD vision, mission and core principles/values

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2063 In doing so, it re-interprets the African historical experience and some of the key moments in the quest for the pan-African ideal. It does so to underscore the point that the core pillar and contribution of Agenda 2063 must be to help translate centuries of efforts to regain freedom, and to rebuild the self-reliance and dignity of Africans into an agenda for individual and collective renaissance. The paper also identifies some of the possible challenges to which the Agenda must respond if it is to be effective and relevant, the existing policy and institutional pillars into which it fits and on which it must build, and a broad menu of issues which would need to be further reflected upon towards its full-fledged articulation. A set of background papers annexed to this synthesis offer a more in-depth assessment of some of these issues, as a foretaste of the kind of additional technical work required in the course of articulating a robust 2063 Agenda for the continent.

(The opening paragraph of the paper offers an extensive overview of “the long walk to freedom”, to paraphrase the iconic President Nelson Mandela, that the continent undertook to free itself from colonial domination and apartheid, and reclaim the dignity of its peoples and the sovereignty of its lands. The struggles for freedom and dignity were an important part of the story of the quest for continental rebirth and must be understood as such. They also embodied numerous milestones in the effort to give content and meaning to pan-Africanism in global and continental contexts; some of the milestones are broached upon briefly, for their importance in setting a broad background context within which Agenda 2063 could be approached and fully made sense of. The following references are made to the relentless struggles, waged by succeeding generations of Africans to reclaim the continent and rebuild its foundations and core: the birth of the anti-colonial pan-Africanist movement, the wave of independence registered during the 1960s, and the establishment of the OAU, to the second wave independence in the 1970s, the eventual defeat of the Rhodesia project, the fall of the apartheid system, and


the historic shift from the OAU to the AU. This is a dynamic which is still on-going and whose correct interpretation and deployment will be critical to the strategic objectives, relevance, expected outcomes and prospects of Agenda 2063

provides a contextual analysis of some of the key contemporary trends unfolding on the continent, with a view to shedding some light on the leading variables that are shaping the process of change across Africa, with an emphasis on the constants, trends and discontinuities regarding the most critical of them.

indicates some of the analytical steps that will have to be undertaken in order to move Agenda 2063 from a stated wish to an action-oriented agenda that the NEPAD Agency can help the continent to implement. The NEPAD Agency’s proposal sets out to help the continent to complete the preparation of a blueprint for the Agenda 2063 implementation.

The blueprint phase will need to:


- Align with member states national development plans;
- Improve on current processes through recommended best practices and automation;
- Optimise future-flexibility of the design to support the growing and changing Africa’s social and economic outlook;
- Deliver a design that will allow the objectives of Agenda 2063 to be met;
- Establish a solid foundation for a delivery unit that will be established.
- The NEPAD Agency is ideally positioned to deliver this blueprint successfully in coordination with directorates of planning at national level, with RECs, and with the African Union Commission.



THE LONG AFRICAN JOURNEY FROM DOMINATION TO REDISCOVERY

The African Renaissance as a History of Struggle and Resilience

The story of humankind cannot be accurately told without Africa featuring at its epicentre as the cradle of humanity. It is a story which, over the ages until the onset of the European slave trade across the Atlantic, was characterised by vibrant experimentations in the making of economy, society, governance, and citizenship in which Africans partook wholesomely. Demographers estimate that around



opportunities than those offered by the simple export of raw materials that the colonial system perfected to the detriment of the continent. Furthermore, development

The structural adjustment programmes did not, of course, go uncontested both intellectually and politically. Africa was indeed to put forward an alternative framework for reform, one that would bring about change without sacrificing growth and the broad socio-economic gains of post-colonial development. Two major initiatives were launched to that end: the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAFSAP) spearheaded by the UNECA, and the Abuja Treaty spearheaded by the

now, and the risk aversion behaviour that had characterised the political elite. It requires political courage, because the new emphasis on inclusiveness could lead to significant change, not only in the geography of wealth but also in the geography of power.

Clearly, no progress can be sustained in the long run where collective action and ownership of policy direction is lacking. By emphasising the need to ensure that Agenda 2063 will be an endogenous effort and will be owned by Africans, African

leaders have expressed their faith in the capacities of the Africans to formulate a common Agenda that they will own and fight for, but also their faith in the capacities of African States to reclaim their sovereignty and the policy spaces they lost during the structural adjustment years. Doing so, as they did on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the OAU, added a measure of symbolism to the call. It immediately called for innovative thinking that could help translate the proactive action of African leaders into a workable and sustainable reality.

BUILDING ON AFRICA'S SELF REDISCOVERY: SOME CRITICAL ISSUES

Economic growth, such as Africa has known over the last decade, is the lynchpin of current narratives about Africa Rising. According to its proponents, economic growth has not only opened the doors to new possibilities for the continent to prosper, it has also increased the attractiveness of African countries for business. Critics of this narrative argue that economic growth is nothing new on the continent and recall the first post-independence decade in which growth was stronger in Africa than in Asia. Interesting as such a debate could be, it is likely to be inconclusive as the main emphasis is on one aspect of the African reality, namely, the economic sphere. Rather than a piecemeal approach, which tends to overemphasise some aspects of African reality and, conversely, downplay other aspects, what is called for is a holistic, systemic approach that is able, in an integrated manner, to uncover the complexities of the "African moment". With this in mind, Agenda 2063 should take as its starting point, the vision expressed by the heads of State in July 2004, which—

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and rapidly growing inequality, the erosion of domestic industrial production capacity, an acceleration of the deagrarianisation of African economies, and an expansion of the boundaries of the informal economy;

Alongside economic and demographic change in Africa are a host of , which cannot be overlooked in the search for a broad renewal across the continent. The centrality of societal dynamics to the project of structural transformation in Africa is underscored by the fact that individuals, families or enterprises operate first and foremost within a social fabric that is characterised by a web of relations and interrelations that could hamper or advance development. There are many different interconnected dimensions to the shifts that are occurring in contemporary societal dynamics across Africa. One of the most frequently discussed dimensions concerns the emergence of a new middle class and, with it, a growing domestic market for various consumer goods. The size of the middle class increased significantly over the last decade in most African

The internal and external contextual factors that serve as the conditioning framework for contemporary Africa's growth suggest that Africa and its people live in a world that is in the throes of a transition that is perilous and fraught with much uncertainty and many dangers. The continental quest for transformation is thus faced with a mixture of challenges and opportunities, which need to be properly managed in order for the continent to complete the task of continental rebirth and renaissance. To do so, African leaders must individually and collectively answer a core set of critical questions.

- a. Take full advantage of Africa's contemporary demography and the central position of the youth therein, in order to turn it into a dynamic factor of growth and fuel for structural change, rather than a time-bomb waiting to detonate;
- b. Manage the unfolding process of urbanisation across the continent in order to meet a plethora of social, economic, and political challenges, including how to feed, clothe, house, administer, and gainfully employ a burgeoning urban mass;
- c. Rebuild the productive base of African economies, with particular attention to agriculture and industry, and with a view to achieving greater economic resilience, improving employment levels, enhancing continental self-reliance, and achieving structural transformation;
- d.

FURTHER ANALYTICAL STEPS FOR DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE, SOUND AGENDA 2063

As indicated in Section 1, the call for a new collective African continental agenda that looks forward to the next 50 years was a mark of the shared determination to carry the unfolding work of self-rediscovery and a continental renaissance to its logical conclusion. It would not be the first time since independence, however, that Africa is seeking to forge a collective programme of action. Learning from past experiences and building on contemporary successes, it would seem that the call for a continental agenda towards 2063 requires a set of steps that would ensure that it will be both

. These steps will inevitably include:

A Dynamic and Strategic Situational Analysis

A sound situational analysis is a foundation and prerequisite for a crisp definition of the strategic objectives and goals of

Out of the situational analysis that needs to be carried out, it should be possible to come to terms with the question: what lies behind the picture? And from there, it should also be possible to proffer appropriate responses. The right question begets the right answer. The situational analysis should also include:

- A careful study of the national development plans and visions which have been adopted by African countries over the last decade and the identification of the common denominators that link them and which could also serve as a link to a continental agenda;
- An unpacking of regional programmes of action that have been adopted by member states with a view to similarly identifying their common denominators and their possible linkages to a continental agenda;
- The unpacking of the slew of continental policy frames and standards that have been adopted under the auspices of the AU or carried over from the OAU, for their internal consistency and compatibility with one another. This should also be done with a view to matching them with national and regional plans and visions, to allow for coherence, build solid grounds for the future domestication of the regional agenda, and strengthen a sense of collective ownership.

As simple as it may look, a mapping of the key issues around which collective African effort can and should be mobilised, and the organisation of in-depth analyses on them, will not be an easy task as the different conceptual and analytical frameworks that underpin them would be at play. Moreover the analysis will have to be made with some sense of prioritisation, with a clear accent being placed on those issues which will be key to the making of a continental renaissance. Luckily, methods exist for carrying out a prioritisation of issues when the web of variables and interrelations between them is as complex as it is in the case of the African momentum. Whatever methodological framework will eventually be used, the situational analysis should clearly help Africans identify three major elements of any systemic approach:

- the constants of the systems, i.e. those variables which will not change during the next 50 years;
- the trends associated with the systems and which are likely to be present and operative in the years to come; and
- the seeds of change which may come into play in the system and eventually bring elements of discontinuity that are capable of altering the trends of the day

The Construction of Scenarios

The construction of scenarios must be part and parcel of the process leading to the formulation of an Agenda 2063. There is no dearth of scenarios concerning Africa at different time horizons. Broadly speaking, three families of scenarios are



INTRODUCTION

Agenda 2063 will not be the first time that Africa seeks to mobilise joint, collective action for continental development. In response to the loss of growth momentum in late 1970s, for example, African leaders came up with their own economic blueprint - the **Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000** - crafted by Africans working through two major institutions, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the Secretariat of the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

As the Lagos Plan of Action, and the NEPAD Programme, Agenda 2063 enunciates the goals of collective self-reliance, emphasising among others the development of domestic markets in Africa rather than reliance on external markets, the control of natural resources by states, the role and importance of domestic factor inputs in development, the imperative of self-sufficiency in food production, the development of human capital and the provision of social infrastructure for the African people. Clearly, by concentrating on sectoral programmes, as the Lagos Plan of Action, and the NEPAD Programme, Agenda 2063 envisages the structural transformation of African economies.

However, the LPA achieved very little because of the lack of an implementation strategy, contrary to the Nepad Program that benefited immediately from creation of a secretariat hosted by South Africa, and financed by its founding members. As a result, CAADP was designed as the first continental sectoral strategy. The fact that the Plan repudiated the logic of the raging neo-liberal development did also constitute an obstacle to the support of the initiative.

Instead of supporting the LPA, and within a year after its adoption by African leaders, the World Bank launched its own report entitled, **Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action**. The report

blamed Africa's economic weaknesses on domestic "policy inadequacies and administrative constraints" and advocated for substantial currency devaluation and trade liberalisation, along with dismantling industrial protection measures. Importantly, these recommendations formed the basis of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that became conditional to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans made to African countries. Unlike the LPA, the World Bank Agenda was boiled down to specific policies, which each country was obliged to implement in order to secure financial support from the World Bank and IMF (the IFIs). In essence, the World Bank Agenda had a clear interface with policies at national level through the articulation of SAPs. A similar framework was lacking for the LPA, making it easy for the IFIs to seize much of the policy initiative, and foreclose the debate – insisting that there was no alternative to SAPs. In addition, the LPA was not accompanied by an explicit financing strategy, possibly because it was counting on the support of the development partners, who had a different idea of what was wrong and how to fix it.

With the shift of emphasis from broader development to macroeconomic stability, the ministries in charge of industry, rural development, education, health and employment and infrastructural development were downgraded. In several African countries, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning was stripped of its economic planning functions in order to focus all its attention on short-term issues: macroeconomic management, emphasising shrinking government budgets and the associated minimalist state syndrome; exchange rate and interest rate J0.1967w 0 -1.2a003>14m broad
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2063 should secure effective interface with national plans, sub-regional initiatives and continental programmes.

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- How should Agenda 2063 best relate with the range of national plans and visions that have been developed or which are being revised, and vice versa?
- How should Agenda 2063 relate with the various existing sub-regional plans and strategies?
- What are the opportunities that should be tapped for financing Africa's development, including Agenda 2063?
-

These groups of actors participate to varying degrees in the aforementioned activities undertaken during the planning process:

Again, in the context of interfacing, while subregional and continental organisations may have their own policy makers and implementers, they have to work in concert with their national counterparts. Indeed, in recognition of the supremacy of national policy makers and implementers, their counterparts from international organisations are typically advisory and/or technical assistants. The remaining two groups of actors cut across local and international boundaries. Indeed, the international donor community members are densely sub-regional, continental and global.

On we can identify:

- short-term (annual) plans,
- medium-term plans (3-5 years) and
- long-term plans (10 years and above).

In the context of interfacing, short-term plans are typically the preserve of national authorities; while national, sub-regional and continental authorities can have medium and long term plans. Meanwhile, there is symbiotic relationship among plans of different time horizons with medium-term development plans serving as instruments for implementing the long-term perspective plans. The annual plans are, in turn, the instruments for implementing the medium term plans.

Typically, financing strategies are broadly stated in long and medium-term plans. They contain an indication of the desired degree of reliance on domestic resources and the preferred areas in which international finance will be need and welcome. This includes foreign direct investment (FDI), and commercial/concessional loans from private, bilateral and multilateral sources. The short-term plan (the budget) contains precise estimates of resource availability from various sources and how they will be deployed. While the source of resources should be guided by the broad strategy in the underlying medium and long-term plans, the expenditure patterns should reflect the development priorities enunciated in the underlying medium-term plan.

IMPERATIVES FOR EFFECTIVE INTERFACE AMONG NATIONAL PLANS, REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES AND AGENDA 2063

In considering imperatives for an effective interface among national plans, regional development initiatives and Agenda 2063, we ascertain the compatibility of key components of a typical plan, the roles of various actors and the time frame. With respect to compatibility of components, the requirement is that the development agenda, plan objective, analysis of options, choice of options and programming, implementation arrangement and monitoring and evaluation should cascade from continental to regional and national levels.

As mentioned earlier, virtually all African countries now embrace different degrees of participatory development planning, and realise that their economies are fundamentally mixed. Accordingly, national visions have been prepared with input from key stakeholder groups. These long-term visions are quite detailed in several cases and provide guidance for articulating medium-term plans necessary for implementing long-term visions. However, the relationships between the short-term plans (the budget) and the medium-term plans are quite tenuous in

many countries. While some of the reasons for the tenuous relationship is understandable, justifiable and hence temporary, (e.g. in cases of unanticipated natural and/or man-made disasters), a persistently tenuous relationship and outright disconnect are due to a lingering aversion to development planning at the operational level. In several African countries, the lack of planning discipline is reflected in anchoring the government budget on the so-called medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF), which is essentially financial programming with no explicit consideration of the requirements of an underlying medium-term development plan. The result is that there is no systematic implementation of the visions, so well articulated in a participatory manner at national level

A cursory look at some regional and continental development initiatives, as well as regional trade policies, also suggests that considerable efforts went into articulating the development agenda, objective(s), analysis of options and choice of options to be followed. Several of them also contain guidance on implementation, including

prescriptions on the proportion of the national budget that should be devoted to such activities. For example, in July 2003, African Heads of State and Government decided that at least 10% of the national budget should be allocated to Agriculture and Rural Development within the next 5 years³.



NEPAD AGENCY PROPOSALS FOR PROMOTING INTERFACE AMONG NATIONAL PLANS, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES AND AGENDA 2063

The foregoing suggests that there is really no conflict among the objectives of national plans, sub-regional and continental development initiatives and Agenda 2063. Clearly, they all seek to secure inclusive growth and economic transformation. Agenda 2063 comes at a time when the neo-liberal development paradigm is giving way



Against this background, we suggest the following options for promoting effective interface among national plans, subregional/continental development initiatives and Agenda 2063


Development planning functions should be revived and be enabled to provide anchorage and clearing framework for all policies and programmes of all government agencies, including the Ministry of Finance. As the human resource base of planning agencies have been degraded under the yoke of SAPs, major efforts should be made to rebuild the capacity of staff of these agencies to undertake participatory planning in mixed economies that are undergoing economic transformation, elements of which are in Ajakaiye (2012) and Ajakaiye (2013). In this regard, the Institute of Development Planning (IDEP), for example, should be supported in its effort to rebuild capacity of public sector staff in participatory planning.

For this purpose, and in the context of the appropriation process in both the legislative and executive arms of government, Agenda 2063 should prescribe that each budget proposal (the short-term plan) should contain a detailing deviations (if any) from the Plan's policies and programmes with justifications. The Plan Compatibility Statement will prevent plan and budget indiscipline and secure sustained plan implementation.

This is important if Agenda 2063 and the underlying developmental state framework is to be effectively operationalised at national level.

For example, participants in training programmes designed to rebuild the capacity of planners should be drawn from public sector organisations, private sector business interest organisations and other non-state actor organisations.

This is especially so for China and India, who should be encouraged to assist in investments aimed at upgrading their infrastructural bases and, above all, incorporating African countries in their global production networks.



adverse effects of such consumption patterns, nor the concomitant impact on the global ecosystem. By contrast, while those in the least advanced regions can barely meet their basic needs, they meet the consumption demands of the richer regions (minerals, energy, agricultural produce and a number of tradable goods) in a manner that exerts intolerable pressure on their immediate ecosystems. This situation is exacerbated by the high impact of the industrial and consumption patterns of their richer co-inhabitants of the earth. Persistent poverty, deadly diseases, ill health, hunger, malnutrition, limited human capability, inadequate access to productive resources and services, income inequalities, etc., are thus problems that hit hardest on those who consume the fewest natural resources, and who have the least capacity to protect themselves.

Governments can play an important developmental role using policy as an instrument for both economic growth and

	Largest countries (over 40million)	Medium large countries (21-40 million)	Medium small countries (6 to 20 Million)-	Smallest countries (less than 6 million)	Total
Year	Percentage distribution				
2010	79	13	6	2	100
2020	79	14	6	2	100
2030	79	14	5	1	100
2040	79	15	5	1	100
2050	79	15	5	1	100
Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects					

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The lower medium-sized and small countries are also expected to continue to grow, but at a slower rate than the larger countries. The number of small countries is expected to increase from 25 in 2010 to 30 in 2050.






Figure 2b: 2010 Age Structure of African Population in Largest and Medium Large Countries

revision.



Source: World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision

Barro and Lee, 2011

As illustrated in Table 4, a number of African countries have graduated from predominantly zero education for ages 25 years and above to predominantly primary school educated by 2010. These include Kenya (55%), Cameroon (54%), Lesotho (61%), Malawi (56%), Senegal (54%), Togo (66%) and Tanzania (61%). A further one third have managed to reach primary school completion targets of between 30% and 48% among their population. Several other countries have graduated even further to predominantly secondary school level at least.

Tanzania	86	65	40	40
59	25	16		

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Barro and Lee 2011

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in educational attainment are very substantial as illustrated by the examples of Togo, Zambia, the Gambia, Benin, Côte D'Ivoire, etc., where women's access to education has been half to one third that of males. In Togo, 45% of males above

Urbanisation and Housing Poverty

Housing poverty is an eloquent testament of the related problems of inequality and deprivation that have come to characterise Africa's development experience since independence. Beyond the usual comment on income disparities between rural and urban areas, it is in urban areas in fact that housing poverty and the gross income inequality it epitomises is most visible. Most African citizens who migrate to urban areas cannot find affordable living space in the formal housing markets because such markets typically target the relatively few high-income earners who have benefited from the educational and employment strategies prevalent across the continent.

Formal sector employees are typically provided with institutional housing only when they are in middle and high-income brackets. Over time, as the middle classes and their incomes have grown in Africa, so too has the transition from mainly institutional housing to private housing markets. This is also a relatively tiny market, however, given the limited target groups and the tiny contribution that mortgages make to Gross National Products on the continent. The 2013 yearbook on housing finance in Africa shows that less than 5% of people in most African countries do not earn an income high enough to afford the cheapest house provided in their formal sector. In Benin and Burundi for instance, only 5% earn enough income to afford the cheapest house, while in Cameroon only 2% have the necessary income.

With decades of policy failure and the resultant backlog of housing delivery in urban areas, Africa is in dire need of imaginative fast-tracking policies that will reduce slums and urban sprawl as well as prevent future increases as urbanisation intensifies. For some countries the size of the problem is already extremely huge. According to the 2011 UN Habitat Report on Affordable Land and Housing in Africa, for instance, slums account for 90% of Chad's urban housing stock, 79% of Ethiopia's, 82% of Niger's and 80% of Mozambique's. These countries have the lowest human development ranking in the world and are also characterised by multidimensional poverty. The report also cites annual deficits of some 70,000 units for Cameroon, 240,000 for the DRC, 120,000 for Kenya, and 175,000 for Algeria. Practically all African countries have need for large extra stocks of housing units. An upgrading of large tracts of slum areas for countries such as Kenya, Angola, Ethiopia, Mali, Sudan and Tanzania would reduce the pressure. The unmet need for decent accommodation for such a large number of people flies in the face of the principle of housing as a human right with the following key components:

- All persons should possess a degree of security of tenure, which guarantees legal protection against forced eviction, harassment and other threats.
- An adequate house must contain certain facilities essential for health, security, comfort and nutrition. All beneficiaries of the right to adequate housing should have sustainable access to natural and common resources, safe drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency services;
- Personal or household financial costs associated with housing should be at such a level that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised.
- Adequate housing must be habitable, in the sense of providing inhabitants with adequate space and protecting them from cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or other threats to health, structural

Social Justice and Democratisation of the Development Voice

The inequalities embedded in the provision of the two social services of education and housing are illustrative of the structural inequalities and corresponding poverty that characterise African socio-economic development. Providing access to such a limited number of people creates and perpetuates systemic poverty across a wide range of social life. Those who benefit educationally, also benefit in terms of access to employment, quality housing, banking and credit, quality health services, water, electricity, sanitation, social security as well as life and health insurance. Education also gives people political voice and the capacity to make demands on their governments and hold them accountable.

The exclusion of such a sizeable proportion of African citizens from access to quality education invariably translates into a society dominated by people who lack the capability to demand accountability from their governments, except

through riots and mass demonstrations that are very often also violent. Such rates of social exclusion are a breeding ground for coups d'état, authoritarian regimes, ethnic conflicts and a generic lack of accountability on the part of both the citizen majorities and their governments. The recognition of the importance of a developmental state as a driver of structural transformation is well founded. However, the strength, nature and character of a developmental state require a supportive developmental society below to voice developmental goals and participate in the formulation of strategies and policies, in institution-building, and in expressing majority interests while protecting vulnerable groups. There is a dynamic relation between state and society that requires mutual nourishing in order to engender a developmental state and a developmental society. It is the state's role to provide social services that enhance societal capacity.

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- 8 In all, five African leaders, namely, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria were critical in the establishment of NEPAD.
 - 9 As part of the process to integrate NEPAD into the African Union structures and processes, the 14th African Union (AU) Summit, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 25 January – 2 February 2010, decided to strengthen the NEPAD programme by transforming the NEPAD Secretariat into an implementation Agency – the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA).
 - 10 See Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa, 10-12 July 2003 (Assembly/AU/Decl. 7 (II)). Available from <http://www.nepad.org/system/files/Maputo%20Declaration.pdf> [Accessed 4 August 2014].
 - 11 See Maputo Declaration on Malaria, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Other Related Infectious Diseases, 10-12 July 2003, Assembly/AU/Decl. 6 (II). Available from <http://www.nepad.org/system/files/Maputo%20Declaration.pdf> [Accessed 4 August 2014].
 - 12 See NEPAD & UNECA, 2013, Mobilizing Domestic Resource Mobilization for Implementing National and Regional NEPAD Programmes and Projects – Africa Looks Within. viii (NEPAD Secretariat and UNECA, Final Report, 25 May 2013). Available from <http://www.africanbondmarkets.org/leadadmin/pdf/Publications/Domestic%20Resource%20Mobilisation%20Study%20May%202013-NEPAD.pdf> [Accessed 4 August 2014].
 - 13 See Ajakaiye (2012) for a characterisation of the changing roles of actors in participatory development planning process as economic transformation progresses.
 - 14 See Ajakaiye (2013) for suggestions in this regard.
 - 15 African statistical Year Book 2013
 - 16 Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, 2013.
 - 17 World Bank, 2007, IMF, 2009.



Agenda 2063 comes at a time when all the right indicators exist for a favourable regional and internal climate for transformative change. This begs the questions: first, to what extent can Agenda 2063 provide new direction in African development that is organic to the interests and needs of the people? Second, if it is to differ from past development experiments, what are the key levers and drivers for the needed transformation? Agenda 2063 is coming at a time when the neo-liberal development models are giving way to realism and when nearly all African countries are committed to a Long-term Continental Agenda on integrated sustainable development. Moreover, subregional cooperation and integration are enjoying a renaissance with the adoption of various subregional sectoral development programmes aimed at promoting subregional production networks and intra-African trade. The Continental Agenda comes against the backdrop of the adoption, under the support of the African Union, of a plethora of subregional/continental standards, frameworks, goals, and targets that span the entire field of socio-economic development.


In order to capitalise on these favourable conditions, Agenda 2063 should secure effective interface with national plans, sub-regional initiatives and continental programmes. In considering imperatives for effective interface among national plans, regional development initiatives and continental processes it is important to check the compatibility of key components of a typical plan, the roles of various actors and the time frame. Member countries should properly domesticate a long-term development agenda, ensuring that the objectives and plan of action of their respective national development plans flow from Agenda 2063. The key elements of an effective transformation agenda for Africa should comprise: a declining share of agriculture in GDP and employment; the transformation of rural areas into vibrant hubs of agri-business and industrial activity; the rise of a modern industrial and service economy; the translation of Africa's youth bulge into a demographic dividend; access to social services that meet minimum standards of quality, regardless of location; reduced gender inequality; and progression towards an inclusive green growth trajectory. Africa's reflection on its own future should be on how to foster inclusive prosperity, reduce potential for violent confrontations and create conditions for peaceful co-existence.

NEPAD's role shall be to guide and promote sub-regional growth initiatives through thematic programs within the framework of Agenda 2063. The NEPAD programs, ranging from economic and social challenges to specific projects (such as the 54

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